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GENERATION  C:  CHILDHOOD,  CODE,
AND CREATIVITY
Andrea M. Matwyshyn*
Children today have a special relationship to technology, one that the law is
unprepared to address.  Four conflicting legal paradigms of childhood are visible
among the four bodies of law that control digital spaces—those of contract, copyright,
free speech, and data privacy/information security—and the tension among these para-
digms is becoming increasingly unsustainable.  As online business models become pro-
gressively more data intensive, the “breathing room” that childhood has been afforded
traditionally is eroding.  Using the work of Erving Goffman and creativity theorists,
this Article argues that particularly in digital commercial contexts, a legal paradigm of
childhood is needed that simultaneously focuses on childhood privacy and creating a
space for creative tinkering leading to entrepreneurship in adulthood.  In this vein, this
Article advocates a two-pronged approach to digital childhood:  first, that a strong
version of the minority capacity doctrine be adopted for contracts in digital spaces, and,
second, that a childhood exception be crafted in copyright law.
INTRODUCTION
A video meme of a befuddled toddler trying to interact with a
magazine as if it were an iPad recently spread across the Internet.1
While amusing, this video embodied more than just another cute tod-
dler “user error”; this video was a harbinger of a dramatic cultural
shift.  We are raising a generation of children for whom technology
 2012 Andrea M. Matwyshyn.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may
reproduce and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for
educational purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to
the Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Andrea M. Matwyshyn is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies at the Wharton
School at the University of Pennsylvania.  The author wishes to thank Gaia Bernstein,
danah boyd, Ian Brown, Ryan Calo, Lilian Edwards, Colin Freund, Jeanne Fromer,
Nicole Garnett, Wendy Gordon, Jennifer E. Hill, Nien-hê Hsieh, Sonia Katyal, Greg
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1 Todd Wasserman, 1-Year-Old Plays With Magazine Like It’s an iPad, MASHABLE
(Oct. 13, 2011), http://mashable.com/2011/10/13/baby-magazine-ipad/.
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and gadgets are the primary point of media reference—the next gen-
eration of technology entrepreneurs.
Today’s children are different from those of past generations:
they view technology as a true extension of the self in ways that previ-
ous generations did not, and they interact with technology more flu-
idly than many of the adults around them.  Just as the developmental
paths of these children will be fundamentally different from those of
previous generations, so too will some of the harms these children will
cause.2  They are Generation C3—a generation of “digital natives”4
that was born into a world already penetrated by the Internet5—and
the law is not ready for them.
This Article introduces the four conflicting legal paradigms of
childhood that dominate virtual spaces: the legal approaches visible in
contract, copyright, free speech, and data privacy/information secur-
ity.  The evolution of digital spaces and their blending with physical
spaces, particularly school environments, signals a need to reconcile
the tensions among these different paradigms of childhood: it is time
to assess the law’s broader conceptualization of childhood and discuss
the implications of this conceptualization for digital childhood.
Relying on the work of Erving Goffman and creativity theorists,
this Article argues that a sound approach to digital childhood, first
and foremost, recognizes two developmental needs—the need for a
private space for identity building without stigma in adulthood and
the need for a space for digital “tinkering” and creativity.  The first
step in building this safe digital space for child development involves a
strong extension of the minority capacity doctrine to digital spaces.
2 These technologies may even cause the physical structures of their brains to be
coded differently, according to some neuroscientists. See Susan Greenfield, Modern
Technology Is Changing the Way Our Brains Work, Says Neuroscientist, DAILY MAIL, http://
www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-565207/Modern-technology-changing-way-
brains-work-says-neuroscientist.html (last visited May 22, 2012).
3 This term referring to the aggregation of “digital natives” as a cohort has
begun to appear in various digital spaces.  The “C” in Generation C has been used to
stand for various different words.  Some possibilities include generation computer,
generation connectivity, generation coder, generation cloud, generation creative,
generation content creator, generation curator, generation collaborative consumer,
generation cracker/hacker, generation collective conscience, generation conver-
gence, and generation cyborg. See, e.g., BOOZ & CO., THE RISE OF GENERATION C 2
(2010), available at http://www.booz.com/media/uploads/Rise_Of_Generation_C.
pdf.
4 For a discussion of digital natives, see, e.g., JOHN PALFREY, URS GASSER, BORN
DIGITAL:  UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES (2009).
5 Dan Pankraz, Introducing Generation C: The Connected Collective Consumer, NIEL-
SENWIRE (Oct. 27, 2010), http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/consumer/introduc-
ing-gen-c-%E2%80%93-the-connected-collective-consumer/.
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This extension paves the way for children’s data protection and
impression management, including what might be termed a chil-
dren’s “right to forget,”6 as well as a default of information accounta-
bility for children’s data.  The second step entails the creation of a
childhood exception in copyright.  While children may indeed cause
copyright harms, in today’s highly tracked technology environment,
applying the same digital copyright approach to children and adults
will detrimentally impact the next generation of technology entrepre-
neurship in the United States. A more developmentally-sensitive
approach in copyright is needed to maintain a space for children’s
tinkering, creativity, and future entrepreneurship.
I. THE FOUR LEGAL PARADIGMS OF DIGITAL CHILDHOOD
The Four Horsemen of the Infocalypse is a colorful slang term
that has long permeated Internet culture.  It is generally understood
to refer to four types of cybercriminals—terrorists, drug dealers,
organized crime/money launderers and Internet child porno-
graphers—and debates over various legal and policy initiatives often
reference the looming specter of these malefactors.  In particular,
technology debates often center on how to best protect children from
these cybercriminals, as well as the necessity of various privacy-invasive
countermeasures toward this goal.
However, these discussions around online child protection fail to
acknowledge a meaningful underlying obstacle.  Law and policy
around children’s behavior in digital spaces are conflicted over a very
basic question: does the law need to protect children from adults’ behavior
in digital spaces or does the law need to protect others from children’s
behavior as if it were adult behavior in digital spaces?  The two are not
always compatible.
Let us begin by stating the obvious: children are not adults.
Developmental differences between children and adults abound: chil-
dren process information differently,7 and they have fewer cumulative
learning episodes and life experiences than do adults.8  Because of
these developmental differences, many bodies of law that interact reg-
ularly with children contain child-protective elements—a different set
of rules for accountability depending on whether the actor is a child
or an adult.9  Determinations of children’s accountability for conduct
6 See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE 4 (2009).
7 See, e.g., DAVID EAGLEMAN, INCOGNITO, Chapter 4 (2011).
8 Id.
9 However, this type of childhood protection is not universal: in particular, the
two dominant bodies of law in digital spaces, contract and copyright, clash on this
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have always been socially and culturally constructed.  For example,
although Roman law presumed capacity at age of fourteen to enter
into agreements,10 during the Middle Ages, boys’ age of majority was
raised to twenty-one.11  In the United States, the law around children’s
accountability has remained relatively constant during the last thirty
years.  The default age of majority in the absence of express statement
to the contrary is eighteen,12 and children under age eighteen are
restricted from many activities: for example, they are not allowed to
participate in the democratic process through voting,13  cannot drive
in some states,14 cannot purchase alcohol in all states,15 cannot get
married in some states,16 cannot consent to medical treatment,17 and
cannot join the military.18  However, with the arrival of the Internet as
a fixture in the lives of children, these seemingly well-settled rules
around the construction of childhood are being tested.
The Internet presents a single space where four different legal
paradigms of childhood converge—contract law, copyright law, free
speech caselaw, and data privacy/information security law.  Each
approaches childhood differently, and their conflict is impacting chil-
dren’s development.  Because these approaches now clash in a single
space, a harmonized approach to digital childhood is needed.
point of whether child protection is necessary.  Contract law says yes; copyright dis-
agrees.  Although this conflict is not new, its importance grows as greater portions of
children’s private lives are played out in digital spaces and subject to both regimes
simultaneously.
10 See Note, Infants’ Contractual Disabilities: Do Modern Sociological and Economic
Trends Demand a Change in the Law?, 41 IND. L.J. 140, 143 (1965).
11 See Andrew A. Schwartz, Old Enough to Fight, Old Enough to Swipe: A Critique of the
Infancy Rule in the Federal Credit Card Act, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 407, 409.
12 Id. at 407.
13 See Steven G. Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90
TEX. L. REV. 1, 98 (2011).
14 See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 649–50 (1968).
15 The lowest drinking age in any state is the age of 18.  Barbara Kritchevsky,
Whose Idea Was It? Why Violations of State Laws Enacted Pursuant to Federal Mandates
Should Not Be Negligence Per Se, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 693.
16 For a comparative discussion of child marriage, see, e.g., Domenico Francavilla,
Interacting Legal Orders and Child Marriages in India, 19 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y &
L. 529 (2011).
17 See B. Jessie Hill, Whose Body? Whose Soul? Medical Decision-making on Behalf of
Children and the Free Exercise Clause Before and After Employment Division v. Smith, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1857 (2011).
18 Parental permission is required.  See, e.g., Amy Beth Abbott, Child Soldiers—The
Use of Children as Instruments of War, 23 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 499 (2000).
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A. Childhood and Contracts
“If a cyber-consumer is a child, then [contractual] accept-
ance. . .might not be valid. This is a difficult issue. . .”19
The dominant body of law on the Internet is—and has always
been—contract law.  Yet, as I have argued elsewhere, courts have been
slow to clarify doctrinal tensions that arise due to the novelty of digital
spaces.20  One such doctrinal deficiency exists with respect to the con-
tract doctrine of “infancy” or “minority.”
1. Minority in Physical Space Contracts
Contract law has traditionally been a legal space that offers a
“childhood exception” which crafts different rules for children as con-
tracting parties.  Through the doctrine of minority, contract law
allows children greater leniency in disavowing their contractual obli-
gations.   In general, the minority doctrine allows “children,” meaning
individuals who have not reached the legal age of capacity, to avoid
liability under their executed contracts.21  Though not without con-
troversy,22 this minority or infancy doctrine has long been employed
in the common law.23  In other words, a policy decision has been
made in contract law to exempt childhood: courts and legislatures
decided that children are in need of an additional level of protection
in their contracting, even if this protection comes at the expense of
the other party to the contract.  However, contract law in digital
spaces has not yet demonstrated an extension of this thread of child
protection.
19 Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implica-
tions of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1063
(2000).
20 Andrea M. Matwyshyn, The Law of the Zebra, BERKELEY TECH. L.J. (forthcoming
2013).
21 See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS § 4.3 (4th ed. 2004); Cheryl B. Preston
& Brandon T. Crowther, Infancy Doctrine Inquiries, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 47, 47
(2012). See generally Robert G. Edge, Voidability of Minors’ Contracts: A Feudal Doctrine in
a Modern Economy, 1 GA. L. REV. 205 (1967) (discussing the voidability of minors’
contracts and the success of the doctrine).
22 Particularly in connection with the extension of the minority defense to tech-
nology contracts, critics might argue that children demonstrate superior technology
proficiency to that of many adults.  However, here the issue is not understanding the
technology intermediation of the contract but rather understanding the nature of
contractual obligations, regardless of whether they are presented online or offline.
23 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, § 4.4; Simon Goodfellow, Who Gets the Better R
Deal?: A Comparison of the U.S. and English Infancy Doctrines, 29 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP.
L. REV. 135, 137 (2005).
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Specifically, a minor can generally disaffirm a contract either
before or a reasonable time after reaching majority,24 either expressly
by words or implicitly by conduct.25  In the language of one court, the
minority doctrine serves to protect minors from “foolishly squander-
ing their wealth through improvident contracts with crafty adults who
would take advantage of them in the market place.”26  The primary
reasons articulated by courts for this protection include children’s
lower sophistication in transactions27 and their lack of fully developed
cognitive abilities.28
Although in general minors can ask a court to set aside their con-
tractual agreements, certain exceptions are frequently applied by
courts.  These exceptions include contracts for “necessaries”29—such
as food and lodging30—and contractual relationships where the
minor retains a benefit.  In these necessaries cases, courts ask whether
the minor received a benefit that is unreturnable or, in the case of
goods, they are returned in substantially worse shape than at time of
purchase.31  Other types of exceptions to the minority doctrine recog-
24 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, § 4.4, at 222; Victoria Slade, Note, The Infancy R
Defense in the Modern Contract Age: A Useful Vestige, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 613, 617
(2011).
25 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 21, § 4.4, at 222.  The minor must disaffirm the R
entire contract and do so no later than within a reasonable time after reaching the
age of majority. Id.
26 Halbman v. Lemke, 298 N.W.2d 562, 564 (Wis. 1980).  In general, minority
capacity cases historically fell into three categories—void, when clearly prejudicial to
the child; voidable, when possibly in the child’s best interest; and valid, when clearly
in the child’s best interests.  This approach has been simplified, allowing minors to
disavow contracts executed prior to the age of capacity.
27 Id.
28 Id. at 564–65.
29 The definition of a necessary varies based on a child’s particular life circum-
stances and the child’s ability to obtain the items from legal guardians. See FARNS-
WORTH, supra note 21, § 4.5, at 225–26. R
30 Necessaries are generally defined by courts as those items required by a child
for sustenance and not provided by a parent.  Whether the subject matter of the con-
tract constitutes a “necessity” is not a bright line.  In most cases, this is a question of
fact depending on the minor’s station in life.  Even in the case where the contract is
found to be for necessities, the minor’s liability is generally not based on the express
terms of the agreement.  Instead, liability is imposed on a quasi-contractual basis mak-
ing the minor liable only for the reasonable value of the goods or services. Id.
31 If possible, most jurisdictions have laws that hold a minor accountable in some
fashion for the benefits he received under the contract by way of restitution, but the
extent of this accountability varies.  Most states take the position that the minor only
has to account for the benefits still in his possession.  The remaining losses are consid-
ered “the result of the very improvidence and indiscretion of infancy which the law
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nized by some courts include contracts ratified after majority,32 the
depreciation rule,33 the status quo rule,34 the emancipation doc-
trine,35 the business rule,36 certain state and subject matter specific
types of agreements,37 and some situations where the minor misrepre-
sented age.38
While a majority of the exceptions involve relatively low
probability events, this last exception regarding misrepresentation
occurs more frequently and presents a particularly complicated set of
questions: courts diverge in their analysis.  In cases relating to an alle-
gation of misrepresentation of age by a minor during the execution of
the contract, some courts find that the adult party relies upon a mis-
representation with respect to the minor’s age, and, ergo, the defense
of minority should be defeated.39  Of the states that recognize this
exception, some require the misrepresentation to be in writing.  How-
ever, other jurisdictions retain the right of the minor to disavow a con-
tract even in instances where a minor affirmatively misrepresents her
age.40  These jurisdictions assert this aggressively child-protective pos-
ture even if misrepresentation is needed:  they argue that a minor’s
has always in mind.” Id. at 225 (quoting Utterstrom v. Myron D. Kidder, Inc., 124 A.
725, 726 (Me. 1924)).
32 Once a minor reaches the age of majority, an express or implied ratification of
the contract made while he was a minor cuts off the power to disaffirm. See id. § 4.4,
at 223.  Interestingly, few courts have determined that a delay in seeking to disaffirm
as an adult is unreasonable without actual reliance by the other party.
33 See id. § 4.5, at 224.
34 Id.
35 Emancipated minors would not be able to handle their general affairs as adults
without losing the protection of the minority capacity doctrine.  Merchants would be
hesitant to contract with them otherwise. See id. § 4.4.
36 A few states have exceptions for merchant minors engaged in business as
adults.  The argument in these jurisdictions is that if a minor possesses the requisite
level of sophistication to operate a commercial enterprise, the minor does not war-
rant the protection of contract. See id. § 4.5.  In some states the general statute of
limitations for contract actions further limits minors’ ability to disavow agreements.
For example, Florida does not toll the statute of the limitations of five years for intra-
state claims by minors and retains the timeframe dictated by other states in causes of
action arising in another state.
37 Id. § 4.5.  In addition to the generally-recognized exceptions discussed above,
various states have enacted statutes that carve out exceptions limiting children’s abil-
ity to disaffirm for certain transactions on policy basis, such as educational loans and
contracts for insurance. Id. § 4.4.
38 See id § 4.5.
39 Id.  New Jersey is one such state.
40 Id.
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intentional falsehood is merely yet another indication of immaturity
and lack of capacity to comprehend a contract.41
Other bodies of law, which arise less frequently in digital con-
texts, similarly follow the developmentally-sensitive approach of con-
tract and also include childhood exceptions.  In tort law, children are
held to standards commensurate with their age,42 intelligence, and
experience to determine whether conduct was tortious.43  For exam-
ple, some jurisdictions have a rebuttable presumption that minors
below the age of adolescence are incapable of acting negligently.44  In
criminal law, child offenders’ records are regularly sealed or
expunged to allow the child a second chance or fresh start despite
criminal errors in judgment.45   In labor law, we also deem children
worthy of special protection: the Fair Labor Standards Act “generally
prohibits the employment of children under eighteen in any occupa-
tion detrimental to their well-being or health.  In particular, the Act
forbids an employer from producing goods for commerce by utilizing
oppressive child labor.”46  In other words, contract’s childhood excep-
tion is not an aberration; children are presumed by many fields of law
to be less mature and rational than adults, and in need of special
protection.47
41 See Juanda Lowder Daniel, Virtually Mature: Examining the Policy of Minors’ Inca-
pacity to Contract Through the Cyberscope, 43 GONZ. L. REV. 239, 248–49 (2008).
42 However, in some jurisdictions, a minor who misrepresents his age during con-
tracting may be held liable in tort for misrepresentation. See id. at 248.
43 In general, many states view children over the age of seven as responsible for
the harm resulting from their conduct and statutorily attribute minors’ conduct to
their parents. See Randall K. Hanson, Parental Liability for Torts of Children: Balancing
the Rights of Victims and Parents, 9 Midwest L. Rev. 77 (1990).
44 The majority of jurisdictions do not have a fixed age below which a child is
conclusively presumed incapable of negligence.  Instead, it is a question of fact gener-
ally reserved for the jury. See generally Lisa Perrochet & Ugo Colella, What a Difference
a Day Makes: Age Presumptions, Child Psychology, and the Standard of Care Required of Chil-
dren, 24 PAC. L.J. 1323 (1993) (exploring the rationales behind different standards of
care and liability for minors in tort law).
45 See generally Patricia Soung, Social and Biological Constructions of Youth: Implica-
tions for Juvenile Justice and Racial Equity, 6 NW. J. L. & SOC. POL’Y 428 (2011) (discuss-
ing the treatment of children offenders in the legal system).
46 Jessica Krieg, There’s No Business Like Show Business: Child Entertainers and the
Law, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 429, 431 (2004) (quoting Erica Siegel, Note, When
Parental Interference Goes Too Far: The Need for Adequate Protection of Child Entertainers &
Athletes, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 427, 442 (2000)).
47 Generally, this presumption must then be overcome by strong competing
interests, which would warrant their treatment as adults.  However, copyright offers
no such presumption of child protection.
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2. Minority in Digital Contracts
Despite Congress’s express intention that digital contracts and
physical space contracts be treated with parity,48 the doctrine of
minority has not been extended universally to digital spaces.  As the
introduction to this Article asserts, child protection has been a cause
celebre for Internet regulation—both criminal49 and commercial.
Minors have been participants in the digital economy since its begin-
ning,50 and the earliest51 commercial data protection statute involved
protection for children’s data.52  Yet, Congressional interest in chil-
dren’s digital contracting and its implications stalled thereafter.
To date, Congress has made only limited forays into the space of
child protection and online contracting.  One attempt was made in
the 1990’s with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, a statute
now viewed by most scholars, businesses, and child welfare experts as
well-intentioned but misguided in its approach.53  The Children’s
Online Privacy Protection Act (“COPPA”) requires that websites
targeting children under the age of thirteen provide notice of privacy
practices and obtain verifiable parental consent prior to collecting
data from a child.54  In this manner, the statute adopted a contract-
48 The E-Sign Act articulated its mission as a step toward creating parity for digital
and physical space contracts.  For a discussion of E-Sign, see, e.g., Robert A. Cook &
Nicole F. Munro, Giving Consumer Disclosures On-Line: Is ESign the Path to the Paperless
Loan?, 57 BUS. LAW. 1187 (2002).
49 See, e.g., Emily Vander Wilt, Considering COPA: A Look at Congress’s Second Attempt
to Regulate Indecency on the Internet, 11 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 373, 376 (2004).
50 For example, in the early 1990s when email accounts were first issued, college
freshmen—some of whom were not yet over 18—received access to the Internet
through their universities.  And, as more households gained Internet access, children
shared in these family Internet connections.
51 Although HIPAA was passed prior to COPPA, COPPA became effective first.
See generally Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Material Vulnerabilities: Data Privacy, Corporate Infor-
mation Security, and Securities Regulation, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 129 (2005) (discussing
HIPPA and COPPA).
52 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006).
53 For an insightful critique of COPPA and its relationship to children and pri-
vacy in the digital economy, see Anita Allen, Minor Distractions:  Children, Privacy and E-
Commerce, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 751 (2001).  See also, Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technology,
Commerce, Development, Identity, 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 515, 546–48 (2007).
54 The statute also empowers the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to promul-
gate additional regulations to require the operator of a website subject to COPPA to
establish and maintain reasonable procedures “to protect the confidentiality, security,
and integrity of personal information collected from children.”  Specifically, COPPA
stipulates that prior to collection of data from a child under thirteen, a website “oper-
ator” must obtain “verifiable parental consent.”  Children’s Online Privacy Protection
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1651–6506 (2006).
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like approach to children’s data protection and accountability—it
mandated disclosure of terms of service and data handling and
obtaining affirmative consent from an individual with contractual
capacity.  Unfortunately, however, as I have argued elsewhere,55 the
statute is fatally flawed both for reasons of technological specificity
and the selection of the somewhat arbitrary age of thirteen.56  In par-
ticular, using the age of thirteen as the ostensible age of consent for
contracting in digital spaces is irreconcilable with the broader con-
tract approach of minority doctrine.  As such, COPPA set up an unsus-
tainable tension between itself and broader contract law.  Further, as
later sections of this Article will argue, using the age of 13 as the magic
end of child protection online is developmentally illogical when
viewed in context of children’s self-disclosure and tinkering behaviors.
However, regardless of COPPA’s efficacy, it can be said that contract
law in digital spaces has also started to embody a type of childhood
exception, yet it has stopped short of reconciling digital and physical
space contract law.
B. Childhood and Copyright Law
The second dominant body of law in digital spaces is copyright
law.  Whereas contract and other bodies of law have expressly recog-
nized the developmental differences between children and adults,
copyright has never adopted a childhood-specific approach.57  Copy-
right generally adopts a one-size-fits-all approach, and no childhood
exception currently exists in copyright.  Why has copyright evolved in
such an unforgiving manner toward childhood?  Some noted copy-
right scholars might argue that a childhood exception has historically
seemed unnecessary: copyright holders have traditionally viewed pur-
suing child infringers as a waste of time because children generally
lack substantial resources to satisfy judgments.58  Another explanation
55 See Matwyshyn, supra note 53, at 547. R
56 Id.
57 Instead, prior to The No Electronic Theft (NET) Act, copyright examined the
extent of noncommercial use or whether things of value were acquired by the alleged
infringer.  However, after the NET Act, the law goes so far as to criminalize copying
for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain, which includes the
receipt of “anything of value.”  With such a broad definition, it seems possible to con-
strue almost any transaction as being for indirect commercial benefit or private finan-
cial gain. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, A Road to No Warez: The No Electronic Theft Act and
Criminal Copyright Infringement, 82 OR. L. REV. 369, 371, 373 (2003).
58 Interview with Wendy Gordon, Professor of Law, Boston University (May 2011)
(on file with the author).
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may be that childhood is simply one of the empty spaces in copyright,
as Professor Julie Cohen has argued in other contexts.59
Regardless of the cause, the Internet appears to have caused a
meaningful shift in copyright litigation dynamics, triggering in turn a
need for copyright to consider childhood.  A caselaw search reveals
evidence consistent with this analysis: few cases appear before 1999
that involve children as copyright infringement defendants.  However,
after 1999, as various Internet filesharing litigation by the Recording
Industry Association of America (RIAA) demonstrates, this traditional
view of ignoring children as possible copyright defendants has now
changed.60 Regardless of whether children tend to lack resources,
children are now sometimes added as defendants in copyright cases.61
Meanwhile, in caselaw where digital copyright and contract law
conflict, courts have been hesitant to extend the doctrine of minority.
For example, in A.V. ex rel. Vanderhye v. iParadigms, LLC,62 a court in
the Eastern District of Virginia applied the benefits exemption63 to
minors’ disavowal of clickwrap terms and conditions of use64 and
denied the minors’ claims of copyright infringement by iParadigms
LLC—a decision subsequently upheld in relevant part by the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals.65  The case involved high school students in
59 See, e.g., Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1151 (2007).
60 The reason for this shift in rights-holder enforcement stems partially from two
critical technology driven dynamics—first, the ease and legal ambiguity of datamining
to unearth digital infringers as compared to real space infringers, and, second, the
commercial reality that most computers and Internet access are purchased by parents
who then permit their children to use both.
61 See, e.g., 12-Year-Old Settles Music Swap Lawsuit, CNN (Feb. 18, 2004), http://
articles.cnn.com/2003-09-09/tech/music.swap.settlement_1_riaa-cary-sherman-kazaa
?_s=PM:TECH; Anders Bylund, RIAA Sues Santangelo Children, Ars Technica (Nov. 3,
2006), http://arstechnica.com/business/news/2006/11/8150.ars.
62 544 F. Supp. 2d 473 (2008), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir.
2009).
63 Id. at 481.
64 The contract read as follows: “You grant iParadigms a non-exclusive, royalty-
free, perpetual, world-wide, irrevocable license to reproduce, transmit, display, dis-
close, archive and otherwise use your Communications on the Site or elsewhere for
our business purposes. We are free to use any ideas, concepts, techniques, know-how
in your Communications for any purpose, including, but not limited to, the develop-
ment and use of products and services based on the Communications . . . . Your sole
remedy for dissatisfaction with the site, site-related services, and/or hyperlinked web
sites is to stop using the site and/or those services.” 562 F.3d at 645–46.
65 Id. at 486.  The Fourth Circuit reversed the lower court on the computer intru-
sion analysis in the case and found that a basis may exist for a claim against the chil-
dren under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: because the company was unaware
that a password posted on the Internet allowed users to register for various accounts.
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Fairfax, Virginia, and Arizona who were required to submit school
assignments through an antiplagiarism program operated by Turnitin,
a subsidiary of iParadigms, which archived minors’ submissions for
later use.66
Undoubtedly, one of the court’s concerns in the iParadigms case
was still a different Internet-caused dynamic: the struggle of the
school in maintaining order and honest learning in a digital world
which presents new opportunities for student plagiarism.  A second
concern in the court’s mind may have involved assisting (adult) entre-
preneurs in building data-intensive business models.  Although both
of these concerns are valid, they should not override basic contract
law and copyright law concerns regarding whether the access to the
underlying material was legitimately granted by the creator, even
when that creator is a child.
The iParadigms case was wrongly decided for multiple reasons of
contract law.  Three contract law arguments were raised by the chil-
dren—first, that the agreement was an unenforceable adhesion con-
tract; second, that the contract was voidable by minors on the basis of
the doctrine of minority; and third, that the express disclaimers of the
contract’s archiving provisions, which were written on the children’s
work, modified the agreement.  The first argument pertaining to the
broader issues of technology-mediated contracts, consumer consent
and adhesion concerns I have discussed elsewhere,67 and these issues
remain concerning, but not child-specific.  With respect to the second
argument, the district court opined that the minority doctrine did not
offer the children an opportunity for disavowal, asserting that the stu-
dents retained the benefits offered by the software program and,
hence, the minors’ disavowal was not appropriate: “[The students]
received a grade from their teachers, allowing them the opportunity
to maintain good standing in the classes in which they were enrolled.
Additionally, Plaintiffs gained the benefit of standing to bring the pre-
sent suit.”68  Particularly when the students are required by law in
In error, the company had allocated resources to determining whether a computer
intrusion had occurred.
66 Id. at 477–78.
67 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconen(t)sus, 85 WASH U. L. REV. 529 (2007).
68 Id. The court went on to characterize the use of the information by iParadigms
as “transformative” and protected fair use. Id. at 483.  On appeal to the Fourth Cir-
cuit, the court agreed, stating “[t]he district court, in our view, correctly determined
that the archiving of plaintiffs’ papers was transformative and favored a finding of
‘fair use.’  iParadigms’ use of these works was completely unrelated to expressive con-
tent and was instead aimed at detecting and discouraging plagiarism.” Id. at 460.
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many instances to attend school69 and, ergo, submit homework assign-
ments, the retained benefit argument is tenuous at best.  The argu-
ment is particularly tenuous with respect to the archiving provisions of
the agreement: it is not entirely clear how the company’s generating
revenue for itself from archiving the children’s work benefits these
particular children.  Requiring that the children grant a perpetual,
irrevocable license to use their work against their will seems of dubi-
ous benefit to the children.  Further, the standing argument made by
the court is somewhat inapposite: contractual privity is not a require-
ment for bringing a copyright infringement claim, which was the pri-
mary allegation in the children’s suit.  Disavowal of the contract
including its archiving terms by the minors should have been deemed
consistent with existing minority doctrine precedent.
The children’s third argument—that their express disclaimers on
their homework asserting that they did not agree to the terms of
archiving their work—similarly holds merit, at least in situations
where the execution of the agreement and the submission happen
concurrently.  Even assuming no disavowal, the student modifications
to the user agreement through a concurrent particularized set of
terms on their homework should have been analyzed by the court as a
modification to the original user agreement and enforced.70  In a case
where personalized modified terms are included in a negotiation of a
form contract, those personalized terms—particularly if included by a
consumer—usually are construed by courts to be included in the final
agreement.71  Since the limitations of iParadigms’ digital contract
presentation did not allow for modification on the agreement itself, a
modification of terms on a concurrent document seems entirely con-
sistent with contract doctrine and the approach of UCC Article 2.
Returning now to the copyright arguments raised in this case—if the
courts erred in the contract law analysis and the original agreement is
indeed either voidable in the discretion of the minor or on the other
hand, enforceable and breached by the company, this potentially calls
into question the courts’ subsequent copyright analysis.72  As this case
69 For a discussion of compulsory education, see e.g., Rebecca Aviel, Compulsory
Education and Substantive Due Process: Asserting Student Rights to a Safe and Healthy School
Facility, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 201 (2006).
70 Susan M. Chesler, Drafting Effective Contracts: How to Revise, Edit, and Use Form
Agreements, 19 BUS. L. TODAY 35, 35 (2009).
71 Id.
72 The courts’ analysis also arguably signals skepticism toward children as creators
of equal parity as adults: the courts’ analysis is potentially out of line with what might
have happened if the children were adults.  For example, in the work-for-hire context
in the absence of clear transfer of rights in created intellectual property, courts err on
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illustrates, use of an Internet application by children has caused the
childhood exception from contract law to come into direct conflict
with a different conceptualization of childhood—that of copyright, a
field without a childhood exception—and this conflict has triggered
doctrinal confusion.
C. Childhood and Speech
A third dispositive body of law in digital spaces is the law of the
First Amendment.  While contract law tends to protect childhood and
copyright tends to ignore it, the First Amendment caselaw adopts a
hybrid approach.   The speech of children is generally afforded the
full panoply of First Amendment protections, however, in limited con-
texts, children’s speech receives a lower level of protection than does
the speech of adults.  Until the arrival of digital media, the school
environment has traditionally presented the primary setting where
children’s speech faces restriction: the underlying concern with pro-
tecting children’s expression and learning sometimes sits in tension
with maintaining order for the benefit of the school community as a
whole.
1. Children and Speech in Physical Spaces
The traditional First Amendment analysis of children’s speech
balances freedom of expression with the need for order in physical
spaces.  In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,73
the Supreme Court found that a group of students who chose to wear
black arm bands to school as an act of protest of the Vietnam War
engaged in a permissible exercise of their First Amendment rights.
The Court held that students’ political expression may not be sup-
pressed by school officials unless they conclude that it will “materially
and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the school.”74  The
Court stated that neither students nor teachers “shed their constitu-
tional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse
gate”75 but “emphasized the need for affirming the comprehensive
authority of the states and of school officials, consistent with funda-
mental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in
the schools.”76  The Court characterized the students’ speech as “a
the side of protecting the (adult) creator’s interest rather than the asserted interest of
the alleged assignee.
73 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
74 Id. at 513.
75 Id. at 506.
76 Id. at 507.
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silent, passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied to buy any disor-
der or disturbance”77 and the school district’s desire to censor it as the
“mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always
accompany an unpopular viewpoint” or a “wish to avoid the contro-
versy which might result from the expression.”78
However, the Court has also held that the First Amendment does
not prevent schools from encouraging habits and manners of civility
through requiring certain modes of expression on school property be
avoided as “inappropriate and subject to sanctions.”79 Similarly, the
Court has deemed schools to hold the right to exercise editorial con-
trol over school newspapers and that such discretion does not violate
the First Amendment.80  Thus, the Court walks a line between preserv-
ing students’ self-realization through their speech and schools’ inter-
est in maintaining civility and order.  The Internet further
complicates this line for the childhood paradigm embodied in free
speech caselaw.
2. Children and Speech in Digital Spaces
Since students have received widespread access to the Internet in
their homes and on mobile devices, schools have faced several new
categories of student conduct challenges, and previous challenges
have been exacerbated.  Apart from the plagiarism concerns that the
court discussed in the iParadigms case,81 for example, schools have
found themselves to be grappling with several categories of “problem”
speech with physical space consequences—digital materials ridiculing
teachers and administrators, cyberbullying of students by other stu-
dents, and other Internet speech by students in digital spaces that may
impact school order.
77 Id. at 508.
78 Id.
79 Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986); see also Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) (holding that a principal’s removal of a banner read-
ing “Bong hits 4 Jesus” at a school sanctioned and supervised event did not constitute
a violation of the students First Amendment rights even though the student was across
the street from the school and not physically on school property during the time he
was holding the banner).
80 However, in connection with a student run publication not sponsored by the
school where “all but an insignificant amount of relevant activity was deliberately
designed to take place beyond the schoolhouse gate,” the Second Circuit concluded
that a suspension for lewd content of the publication violated the students’ First
Amendment rights and was not equivalent to, for example, breaking into the princi-
pal’s office or a teacher’s desk. See Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 1043, 1050 (2d
Cir. 1979).
81 A.V. v. iParadigms, 562 F.3d 630 (4th Cir. 2009).
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In Layshock ex rel Layshock v. Hermitage School District82 the Third
Circuit considered the questions surrounding the suspension of a 17-
year-old senior in connection with his creation of a parody profile of
his principal on MySpace using a photograph that the minor copied
from the school district website.83  The faux profile contained state-
ments about alcohol and drug use, promiscuity, anatomical deficien-
cies, and sexual orientation.84  The minor then shared the profile with
other students who passed it on to a wider audience.85  At least four
other students subsequently posted similarly unflattering profiles of
the principal on MySpace.86  The minor also accessed the MySpace
profile he created of the principal using a school computer in a class-
room, at which point a teacher caught a glimpse of the profile.87
On appeal88 the Third Circuit stated that “it would be an
unseemly and dangerous precedent to allow the state in the guise of
school authorities to reach into a child’s home and control his/her
actions there to the same extent that they can control the child when
he/she participates in school sponsored activities . . . . [W]e therefore
conclude that the District Court correctly ruled that the district’s
response to [the minor’s] expressive conduct violated the First
Amendment guarantee of free expression.”89  On the school district
arguments that the minor’s speech was not protected because it was
82 650 F.3d 205 (3d Cir. 2011).
83 Id. at 208.
84 Id. at 209.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. School administrators lacked the technology skills to block students revisit-
ing the MySpace page on school property because the Technology Coordinator was
on vacation at the time.  Instead administrators limited students’ access to supervised
machines. Id.
88 At a hearing the minor was found guilty of all charges with respect to the disci-
plinary code violations and given a ten day out of school suspension as well as being
placed in an alternative education program for the remainder of the year, being
banned from all extracurricular activities, and not being allowed to participate in his
graduation ceremony. Id. at 210.  The minor’s parents were advised that the school
district was also considering expulsion, at which point they filed suit alleging that the
district’s punishment of the minor violated his rights under the First Amendment,
that the district policies and rules were unconstitutionally vague and/or overbroad
both on their face and as applied to the minor, and that the district’s punishments of
the minor interfered with the parents’ rights of determining how to best raise and
educate their child. Id.  On a motion for summary judgment the court ruled in favor
of the minor and his parents on the First Amendment claim, but ruled against them
on the 14th Amendment due process claims. Id. at 211.  Both parties appealed. Id. at
215.
89 89  Id. at 216.
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vulgar, lewd, offensive, and ended up inside the school community,
the court highlighted the fact that the unflattering profiles caused no
foreseeable and substantial behavioral disruption of the students in
the school and again deemed the student’s punishment an inappro-
priate exercise of school discretion that infringed on students’ First
Amendment rights.90  The court also ruled that the District Court did
not err in dismissing of the parents’ claim of a violation the 14th
Amendment right to raise their child.91  Although both lower courts
and legal commentators hoped that the Supreme Court might review
this case and grant certiorari, the Court did not accept the case onto
its docket.92
“Problem” speech is not limited to principal parody sites.  For
example, some schools are worried about gang and other violent activ-
ity seeping into the school.  Because of this concern, teachers, and
administrators have sometimes begun to monitor students’ social net-
work posts93 and YouTube videos, and sometimes have discovered
bragging about school violence.  Even videos of violence in school
hallways now appear on social media sites.94  In particular, questions
90 Id. at 222.
91 Id.
92 David Kravets, Supreme Court Rejects Student Social-Media Cases, WIRED.COM (Jan.
17, 2012), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2012/01/scotus-student-social-media/.
As this case demonstrates, schools struggle to understand where the line exists
between discipline inside and outside the schoolhouse gates for purposes of maintain-
ing behavioral control over students and their Internet speech.  Schools have
responded through novel methods of attempting to maintain behavioral control, but
these methods have sometimes gone awry. Further, as legislatures worry about teach-
ers taking advantage of students with the help of the Internet, sometimes overzealous
legislation in this space additionally complicates the dynamic.
93 For example, in Georgia, two teens were arrested in connection with threats
posted on MySpace.com that stated that they wanted to shoot people at the school.
See School Threats, School Violence Rumors, School Text Message Rumors, & Threat Assess-
ment, NAT’L SCH. SAFETY AND SEC. SERVS., http://www.schoolsecurity.org/trends/
threats.html (last visited May 22, 2012).
94 See, e.g., Vernon Odom, Girl Gang Violence at Phila. School Caught on Tape,
ABC (Jan. 6, 2011), http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=News/local&id=
7882169.  It is this ambiguous line in student-teacher relations in digital spaces that
has moved some legislatures to act.  Recently the state of Missouri experimented with
a new law that prohibited teachers from privately chatting with students over social
network sites such as Facebook.  Although the law, the Amy Hestir Student Protection
Act, initially passed, an outcry from teachers resulted in the legislature voting to
repeal the contentious portion.  SCS/SB 54 Amy Hestir Student Protection Act, Jul.
14, 2011, available at http://www.senate.mo.gov/11info/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?BillID=
4066479&SessionType=R.  The law was Missouri’s attempt to address the various scan-
dals and complaints involving teachers who misuse social media to become inappro-
priately close to their students.  Kevin Murphy, Missouri Teachers Sue to Block Social
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of cyberbullying have galvanized both legislators and school adminis-
trators to address forms of bullying that occur through children’s
speech in digital spaces but seep into physical space school environ-
ments.  A number of student suicides have occurred allegedly as a
result of online bullying by classmates, and a significant number of
states have either passed cyberbullying legislation or amended prior
legislation to include digital harassment.95  Some state statutes go so
far as to require that coordinators be appointed inside schools to
ensure that all cyberbullying complaints are addressed.96  However,
the line where well-intentioned involvement by teachers and adminis-
trators turns into privacy violation of students’ lives is also unclear.97
Media Law, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2011, 1:48 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2011/08/20/us-schools-missouri-suit-idUSTRE77J1QW20110820.  However, some
teachers believe that social media can be a useful educational tool and provides a
novel way to connect to their students; these teachers believe their use of social media
assists students in learning using a comfortable technological space. See id.; Jennifer
Preston, Rules to Stop Pupil and Teacher From Getting Too Social Online, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
17, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/18/business/media/rules-to-limit-how-
teachers-and-students-interact-online.html?_r=1.  The Missouri State Teachers Associ-
ation sued the state over the law and, two days before the law was to become effective,
a Cole County Circuit Court issued an injunction against the bill, noting the chilling
effects on free speech of both teachers and students. Id.  The revised version of the
law requires each school district to draft its own social media policy by March 1, 2012.
Id.  Numerous school boards across the country are facing similar questions in the
context of student teacher digital communications.  School boards in California, Flor-
ida, Georgia, Illinois, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Virginia have either recently altered or rewritten their policies to address
digital media questions. Id.
95 One of the most famous cases involved a 13-year-old named Megan Meier who
was bullied online by former classmates and an adult. See, e.g., MEGAN MEIER FOUNDA-
TION, http://www.meganmeierfoundation.org/.  Posing as a teenage boy who feigned
interest in her, these individuals verbally abused Megan Meier, who eventually took
her own life. Id. Subsequently the adult who participated in the bullying was put on
trial for computer intrusion and was convicted by a jury, though the verdict was ulti-
mately set aside by the judge.  United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
Megan Meier’s death provided the catalyst for Missouri to pass cyberbullying legisla-
tion. See, e.g., MEGAN MEIER FOUNDATION, http://www.meganmeierfoundation.org/.
96 See Linda Conner Lambeck, New Cyberbullying Law Forces Schools to Intervene,
CONN. POST (October 8, 2011), http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/New-cyberbully-
ing-law-forces-schools-to-intervene-2209625.php.
97 In fact, some cases of student monitoring are extreme.  It is now becoming
more common in some school districts to issue laptops to students to assist in their
learning; however, schools have sometimes used the theft retrieval systems on these
machines to monitor the behavior of students while at home.  In one recent set of
cases, a school district in suburban Philadelphia monitored students’ conduct
remotely by activating the webcams on school issued laptops.  Parents had executed a
consent document on behalf of their students that was presented in connection with
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In these ways, the lines between public and private space for stu-
dents and teachers become further blurred.  When the schoolhouse
gates remain open and extended through the use of social media, the
boundaries of protection for children’s speech that have been articu-
lated in previous case law are called into question.  These technology
challenges faced by schools today hinge not only on the pace of tech-
nological change but also, in particular, on the doctrinal confusion
that exists in law around data privacy and information security—the
legal space where contract, copyright/IP, and speech converge.
D. Childhood and Privacy/Information Security Law
As the previous sections have explained, while traditional con-
tract doctrine protects children from others through the “childhood
exception” of the minority doctrine, digital contract law has not
expressly expanded the reach of the minority doctrine to virtual
spaces.  Meanwhile, copyright has always treated children essentially as
adults.  These two dynamics intersect in the context of children’s free
speech, where schools may limit speech in order to maintain order
and protect children from each other within the schoolhouse walls.
Privacy and information security law concerns now take these
legal constructions of childhood and complicate them still further:
privacy and information security queries blend contract, intellectual
property, and speech questions with additional novel child protection
concerns.  In other words, the legal uncertainty of consequences for
the issuing of the laptop.  Although parents consented to the students’ use of the
laptop, parents became enraged to find out of that this consent ostensibly gave the
school district permission to monitor their children in private spaces, such as their
bedrooms.  In the course of several cases filed surrounding this incident of remote
webcam school monitoring of students in their homes, thousands of pictures of high
school students were unearthed in discovery, many of which included pictures of stu-
dents in “private” behaviors—various states of undress, sleeping, studying while believ-
ing themselves to be unobserved.  The school district in question in Lower Merion
Township admitted that it captured thousands of WebCam photographs and screen-
shots from student laptops allegedly as part of a misguided attempt to locate lost
machines.  In one filed case in particular, Robins v. Lower Merion Township School Dis-
trict, the plaintiff alleged that the school used tracking technology to spy on him
inside his home.  During discovery evidence came to light that he was photographed
over 400 times during a two-week period, sometimes as he slept.  According to the
pleadings, the student became aware of the photographs being taken of him remotely
when a vice principal referenced a photo that included what the administrator
alleged was the student engaging in drug use. See, e.g., Mark S. Haltzman et al., Blake
J. Robbins v. Lower Merion School District, HEARTLAND INST. (Feb. 11, 2010), http://
heartland.org/policybot/results/27289/Blake_J_Robbins_v_Lower_Merion_School_
District.html.  The school district in question settled with the various plaintiffs in con-
nection with these tracking programs on school issued laptops. Id.
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children’s behaviors in digital spaces becomes magnified in privacy
and information security contexts: because privacy and information
security law essentially incorporate by reference contract and intellec-
tual property law and the subject matter at issue involves speech, the
paradigm conflict presented by those three regimes is also incorpo-
rated by reference.
However, privacy and information security queries with respect to
children also present two novel sets of concerns.  First, in contexts
involving privacy and information security concerns, children are
exposed due to their immaturity in presentation of self.  Children vol-
untarily disclose large amounts of personal information without
understanding consequences, and corporate datamining encourages
these disclosure behaviors.  Second, children are legally exposed due
to their increased comfort with code experimentation, while not nec-
essarily being able to foresee the possible legal consequences of that
experimentation.  Because technology skills do not map onto chrono-
logical age, children may be doubly exposed in privacy and informa-
tion security law situations, perhaps without having any adult
supervisor skilled enough to guide them.
1. Identity Experimentation: The Problem of Overdisclosure
In what is perhaps best described as an unfortunate deficit of
judgment, a teen recently posted a publicly viewable invitation to a
party at her house on Facebook.98  To her surprise, approximately 400
people attended, causing significant damage to the house.99  Why did
she not foresee this possible consequence?
Children can frequently feel a false sense of safety in digital envi-
ronments, particularly when accessing the Internet from the security
of their own bedrooms.  This false sense of security, in turn, com-
monly leads them to overdisclose information in digital spaces.  When
coupled with data aggregators’ progressively more aggressive mining
techniques, the extent of information that becomes available about a
particular child quickly becomes substantial.
As I have explained in other work,100 questions of privacy are
inexorably bound up with questions of contract and intellectual prop-
erty.101  Cases such as the iParadigms case are a harbinger of children’s
98 See Nick Douglas, 400 Teens Destroy $8.7 Million Home After Facebook Party Invite,
GAWKER (May 30, 2008), http://gawker.com/394312/400-teens-destroy-87-million-
home-after-facebook-party-invite.
99 Id.
100 See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Privacy, The Hacker Way (draft on file with author)
101 Id.
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cases to come.  Particularly in cases where minors will seek to disavow
their agreements with social networking websites, cloud services prov-
iders and search engines over privacy concerns, the childhood para-
digms of physical space and physical space will clash.  Database owners
will assert what I have termed elsewhere an “information ownership
paradox”—that they possess a copyright interest in their databases of
compiled children’s information but simultaneously that the individ-
ual children have no residual intellectual property interest.102
In particular, it is older teens who are most likely to be vulnerable
with respect to the information they overdisclose in online contexts:
when we consider phenomena such as the teen “sexting” epidemic,103
we realize that it is teens who are perhaps most likely to post content
that will prove stigmatizing later.  Although many children do not
realize it at the time, the digital record of information that they have
shared will follow them for the remainder of their lives.  Because a
great number of employers now use social network profile informa-
tion for purposes of screening, the students may be denied employ-
ment opportunities in later life because of imprudent postings104 they
make as teens, and colleges frequently use social network information
102 For a discussion of these copyright arguments see, e.g., Andrea M. Matwyshyn
& Jennifer Mueller, Code and Creativity (draft on file with author).  The owner of a
copyright enjoys “a bundle of exclusive rights” under section 106 of the Copyright
Act, Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985),
including the right to copy, the right to publish, and the right to distribute an
author’s work, see id. at 547; see also 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006) (also including among
fundamental rights in copyrighted works rights to display, to perform, and to prepare
derivative works).  These rights “vest in the author of an original work from the time
of its creation.” Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 547. “ ‘Anyone who violates any of the
exclusive rights of the copyright owner,’ that is, anyone who trespasses into his exclu-
sive domain by using or authorizing the use of the copyrighted work . . . ‘is an
infringer of the copyright.’”  Sony Corp. of Am. v. Univ. City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 433 (1984) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 501(a)).  Databases—if protectable by copyright
law—are generally analyzed as compilations.  Under the Copyright Act, a compilation
is defined as a “collection and assembling of preexisting materials or of data that are
selected in such a way that the resulting work as a whole constitutes an original work
of authorship.”  However, the copyright in the compilation itself does not extend to
the underlying materials, and the underlying materials or data may be either pro-
tected by copyright, or they may be unprotectable facts or ideas.
103 See Amanda Lehnhart, Teens and Sexting, PEW INTERNET AND AMERICAN LIFE
PROJECT (Dec. 15, 2009), http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/teens-and-sexting.pdf.
104 See Jenna Wortham, More Employers Use Social Networks to Check Out Applicants,
NY TIMES (Aug. 20, 2009), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/more-employ-
ers-use-social-networks-to-check-out-applicants.
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as the basis for screening for admission as well.105  Yet, as Part III will
argue, these forays in identity building in virtual spaces, while perhaps
unfamiliar to older generations, are, nevertheless, today’s markers of
childhood and need a cushion of privacy.
2. Code Experimentation: Channeling Children’s Curiosity and
Creativity
The second set of privacy/information security issues relate to
children’s tinkering with code.  Children’s development is now inexo-
rably bound up with code and technology,106 and today’s children no
longer remember a world without the Internet.  Learning to build and
break code becomes an increasingly important skillset for their future
employment.  Learning C++ is perhaps the technology equivalent of
learning Spanish.  Just as diagramming sentences was deemed impor-
tant to children’s education by many educators in the last century, so
too it can be argued that understanding the building and breaking of
code will be essential to children’s education in this century.
Children have always been part of the code writing and breaking
community,107 and their role is fast becoming officially acknowledged.
For example, at a key information security event, DEF CON108—an
event that has existed for twenty years—last year marked the first time
that a special section devoted to children was officially included as
part of the program.  DEF CON Kids, a program intended for “begin-
ning hackers age 8-16,”109 offered classroom and workshop instruc-
105 See Ryan Lytle, College Admissions Officials Turn to Facebook to Research Students,
US NEWS (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.usnews.com/education/best-colleges/articles/
2011/10/10/college-admissions-officials-turn-to-facebook-to-research-students.
106 This insight comes from work of such theorists as Vygotsky, Bandura and
Bronfenbrenner.
107 For example, Bill Gates started his experimentation with code as a teenager.
See, e.g., Sue Shellenbarger, Brat or Budding Genius? Lessons From Bill Gates’ Childhood,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2009/04/28/brat-or-bud-
ding-genius-lessons-from-bill-gates-childhood/.
108 Self-described as “one of the oldest continuous running hacker conventions
around, and also one of the largest,” Official DEF CON FAQ v. 0.95, DEF CON, https:/
/www.defcon.org/html/links/dc-faq/dc-faq.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2012), DEF
CON brings together a motley crew of code breaking enthusiasts, information security
professionals, criminals, technology policy advocates, academics, and federal agents.
From the DEF CON FAQ: “Do criminals go to DEF CON?  Yes.  They also go to high
school, college, work in your workplace, and the government.  There are also lawyers,
law enforcement agents, civil libertarians, cryptographers, and hackers in attend-
ance.” Id.
109 About, DEF CON KIDS, http://www.defconkids.org/?page_id=4 (last visited
Mar. 20, 2012).
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tion on topics such as “Hardware Hacking” and “Google Hacking.”  It
also included sessions where the attendees could “Meet the Feds”
from agencies such as DHS and NSA.110  Although minors have been
visible at prior DEF CONs, the launch of a DEF CON Kids111 program
highlights an important shift in our culture around children and their
relationship to breaking and building code.  DEF CON Kids and
another conference called HacKid112 are a call to those of us working
in technology policy and legal circles to recognize that something
basic has changed for children.
Guiding children in productive rather than destructive paths with
their code breaking and building experimentation needs to be a
proactive educational enterprise; but, this is a daunting enterprise
when many parents lack sophisticated technology skills.113  Also,
equally importantly, the freedom to experiment that digital spaces
offer stimulates creativity and entrepreneurship in children, spurring
them to become the next generation of digital entrepreneurs.
It is these two concerns—privacy for identity building and space
for creativity—that need to be the hallmark of any future digital child-
hood paradigm.  The next sections begin to build a paradigm of child-
hood in digital spaces that addresses these two privacy problems
children face in digital contexts—maintaining data control and find-
ing a safe space for creative experimentation.  In particular, the role
of schools should be considered in facilitating future digital child-
hood paradigms.  Because schools sit at the interface of the family and
the society, their unique position provides an opportunity for technol-
ogy education, particularly when individual parents lack the technol-
ogy proficiency to guide their children’s technology learning.
110 Classroon, DEF CON KIDS, http://www.defconkids.org/?page_id=10#sat15 (last
visited Mar. 20, 2012).
111 DEF CON KIDS, http://www.defconkids.org/ (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
112  “[A] new kind of conference . . . for the entire family—kids aged 5–17 & their
parents—in order to raise awareness, excitement and understanding of technology
. . . security and engineering and their impact on society and culture,” FAQ, HACKID,
http://www.hackid.org/Drupal/faq (last visited Mar. 20, 2012).
113 Further, the presence of DHS, NSA, and other government agencies at confer-
ences such as DEF CON Kids reminds us that training the next generation of digital
defenders is essential to national security.  At least two recent major hacks may indi-
cate that other countries already possess sophisticated divisions of military focused on
Internet espionage and, potentially, cyberwarfare.  Identifying and training an elite
corps of soldiers and technology experts for purposes of national defense is growing
in importance. See Robert McMillan, Leaked U.S. Document Links China to Google Attack,
COMPUTERWORLD, (Nov. 28, 2010), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/91981
98/Leaked_U.S._document_links_China_to_Google_attack.
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II. DEVELOPMENT AND GENERATION C
In their book Born Digital, Professors Palfrey and Gasser argue
that children are growing up today with technology as an integral part
of their existence—as “digital natives.”  As such, they are experiencing
a fundamentally different childhood than that of their parents.114
“They study, work, write, and interact with each other in ways that are
very different from the ways that [their parents] did growing up . . . .
Major aspects of their lives—social interactions, friendships, civic
activities—are mediated by digital technologies.  And they’ve never
known any other way of life.”115
Palfrey and Gasser point to these Digital Natives being constantly
connected to others through technology and meeting and changing
friends in more fleeting ways.  Similarly they assert that these children
view privacy and information sharing differently from their parents
and grandparents.
In the process of spending so much time in this digitally connected
environment, Digital Natives are leaving more traces of themselves
in public places online.  At their best, they show off who they aspire
to be and put their most creative selves before the world.  At their
worst, they put information online that may put them in danger, or
that could humiliate them in years to come.116
I would argue potentially one step further:  a legitimate question
exists as to whether many of today’s children are perhaps beginning
to perceive their digital reality to be their dominant reality—a reality
of their own construction with fewer rules and minimal adult supervi-
sion, occasionally reminiscent of Lord of the Flies.117  When we think
about cases of teen suicide as a result of exchanges on social network
sites,118 we start to realize the emotional potency of these digital
spaces for children.  A legal paradigm for childhood in digital spaces
114 It is worth noting that despite the vast majority of children today growing up as
digital natives in the United States, a “digital divide” still limits opportunities for many
children in lower income homes and in countries outside the United States.
115 JOHN PALFREY & URS GASSER, BORN DIGITAL (2009).
116 Id.
117 For example, one social norm on the rise that is troubling to some parents is
children’s terminating of romantic relationships through status message changes on
Facebook.  According to at least one study, approximately ten percent of children
have ended a relationship through a status change on Facebook. See Brenna Ehrlich,
Boy Meets Girl: How Facebook Functions in Modern Romance, MASHABLE (Nov. 19, 2010),
http://mashable.com/2010/11/19/seventeen-facebook-study/.
118 See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Verdict in MySpace Suicide Case, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/us/27myspace.html.
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should be conscious of this context from the child’s perspective as
well as an adult’s.
As the previous section explained, current legal approaches are
somewhat deficient in providing a safe space for digital childhood,
particularly in the context of privacy and information security chal-
lenges.  Here, I argue that the correct path to crafting a paradigm for
childhood in digital spaces should be a positively framed one that
focuses on child development, rather than a harm-based one: chil-
dren’s developmental needs should be at the core of an approach to
childhood in digital spaces, rather than punishing them as adults for
all the potential harms their experimentation may cause.  By structur-
ing the child’s developmental health as the centerpoint for building a
paradigm, we may avoid some of the tensions of prior approaches to
childhood; we instead craft a “breathing space” for the child’s growth.
Children—particularly today’s technologically-fluent children—need
a safe space for learning “impression management” and for identity
creation, and, meanwhile, our society needs to facilitate digital creativ-
ity in these children as the next generation of inventors and
entrepreneurs.119
A. Goffman and the “Digital Native”
Child development does not happen in a vacuum.  As I have
argued elsewhere,120 the correct paradigm for conceptualizing human
development is an ecological and contextualist one in line with the
theory of Vygotsky, Bandura, and Bronfenbrenner: children develop
in a particular context, and they are influenced by the tools their envi-
ronment offers.121  Essentially, development is a historically, cultur-
ally, and technologically specific construct—a dialectic conversation
between the person and the environment.122
For example, applying a contextualist approach to development,
we know that a child with access to a computer and broadband from
119 Although a harm-based framing around defending others from children’s con-
duct in virtual spaces may be warranted in some circumstances, these cases should be
viewed as the exceptions, not the dominant focus of an approach to digital childhood.
By crafting a safe space for digital childhood, a portion of the harms—such as
cyberbullying—may self-mitigate.  Thus, the starting point for crafting a paradigm of
childhood in virtual spaces must be one that reserves space for children’s identity
formation and creativity.  The next sections explain why and how we might start build-
ing a more privacy protective approach in this manner, borrowing lessons from sociol-
ogy and psychology.
120 See, e.g., Matwyshyn, supra note 53. R
121 Id.
122 Id.
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age two in the United States will develop in a fundamentally different
manner than a child in Zambia whose first Internet access comes
through a phone at age sixteen.  These children’s development is
nonlinear123—the first child may demonstrate superior technology
skills at age eight to those of the second child at age eighteen.  The
first child’s skills may also significantly outstrip the skills of her par-
ents, and parental supervision of children with superior technology
skills presents a significant challenge for even the most diligent
parent.
Having established this mechanism of development and the com-
plexity that technology brings, we next turn to the difficult legal ques-
tions surrounding childhood identity building, experimentation, and
accountability.  Two competing dynamics impact children’s identity
expression in digital spaces with respect to privacy questions—one
internal to the child and one external.  The first is an internally moti-
vated need for identity building and expression in a community, and
the second is the risk that the digital trail of this experimentation will
limit future opportunities for the child through generating stigma.  It
is this set of developmental concerns relating to identity, privacy, and
creativity that this section considers using the theory of Erving
Goffman.
1. Impression Management: The Bureaucratization of Spirit
The role of identity experimentation and its connection to
human development is perhaps most associated with the seminal work
of notable sociologist Erving Goffman.124  Goffman introduced the
concept of “impression management”—where individuals, like actors,
attempt to influence a situation by conveying an impression that it is
123 Id.
124 Although few applications of Goffman to digital contexts exist in the legal liter-
ature, Professor Neil Richards notably applied Goffman to the adult privacy context.
Richards argues that
Goffman’s insights suggest that intellectual privacy can contribute to self-
governance in two related ways.  First, psychologically we may have a deep
need to relax and relieve the tensions that are a necessary part of public
performance. . . . Second, if we are to participate in our public roles as self-
governing citizens, we must ensure that the state cannot scrutinize our intel-
lectual dabblings in the controversial or deviant.
See Neil Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 406 (2008).  For a discussion
of Goffman and symbolic interactionism, see, e.g., ALICE MARAWICK & DANAH BOYD, I
TWEET HONESTLY, I TWEET PASSIONATELY, available at http://www.tiara.org/blog/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/marwick_boyd_twitter_nms.pdf.
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in their interest to convey.125  In other words, individuals experiment
with crafting and performing personas for themselves while monitor-
ing the reactions of others126 to these personas or characters.127  In
Goffman’s words, “[t]he expressiveness of the individual appears to
involve two radically different kinds of sign activity: the expression
that he gives, and the expression that he gives off.”128
Goffman uses the metaphor of a play being staged in the theater
to convey the dynamics of identity crafting.  A person, like an actor,
has the ability to choose his stage and props, as well as the costume for
a specific audience.129  The goal for the actor is to maintain coher-
ence and to adjust to the different stagings and interaction with other
125 “Regardless of the particular objective which the individual has in mind
and of his motive for having this objective, it will be in his interests to control
the conduct of others, especially their responsive treatment of him.  This
control is achieved largely by influencing the definition of the situation
which others come to formulate, and he can influence this definition by
expressing himself in such a way as to give them the kind of impression that
will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his own plan. Thus,
when an individual appears in the presence of others, there will usually be
some reason for him to mobilize his activity so that it will convey an impres-
sion to others which it is in his interests to convey.
ERVING GOFFMAN, PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE, 3–4 (1959).
126 “When we allow that the individual projects a definition of the situation when
he appears before others, we must also see that the others, however passive their role
may seem to be, will themselves effectively projects a definition of the situation by
virtue of their response to the individual and by virtue of the lines of action they
initiate to him.”  Id. at 9.
127 In our society the character one performs and one’s self are somewhat
equated, and this self-as-character is usually seen as something housed within
the body of its possessor, especially the upper parts thereof, being a nodule,
somehow, in the in the psychobiology of personality. . . . In this report the
performed self was seen as some kind of image [“front”], usually creditable,
which the individual on stage and in character effectively attempts to induce
others to hold in regard to him.  While this image is entertained concerning
the individual, so that a self is imputed to him, this self itself does not derive
from its possessor, but from the whole scene of his action, being generated
by that attribute of local events which renders them interpretable by wit-
nesses.  A correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to
impute a self to a performed character, but this imputation—this self—is a
product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it.  The self, then, as
a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a specific location,
whose fundamental fates is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a dramatic
effect arising diffusely from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic
issue, the crucial concern, is whether it will be credited or discredited.
Id. at 252–53.
128 Id. at. 2.
129 Id.
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actors.130  In other words, for Goffman, it can be said that certain
structural constraints both enable and limit agency and vice versa.  It
is precisely negotiating this tension between creating expression and
creating an impression that children, particularly teens, are still in the
process of learning to manage.  Meanwhile, these child performances
now simultaneously play out on two stages at once—one performance
in physical space for a physical audience and a second in digital spaces
for a (sometimes overlapping) virtual audience.  For Goffman, it is of
fundamental importance to have an agreed upon definition of the
situation.  Without a clear set of parameters and shared definition
guiding the structure of a given interaction, the interaction lacks
coherency and the actors’ ability to manage impressions falters.131
Perhaps the most important insight that Goffman’s work offers us
in terms of understanding the challenges of children’s interactions in
digital spaces relates to this notion of coherence.  A coherence prob-
lem currently permeates children’s interactions in digital spaces.
Apart from the legal coherence problem of the four conflicting para-
digms of childhood discussed in the prior section, children—as well as
adults—struggle to impression manage successfully in digital spaces.
In digital spaces such as social media, the audiences for the perform-
ance are sometimes unexpectedly bundled together across various
contexts, and future audiences are not always foreseen or even fore-
seeable.  In particular, the ability to maintain what Goffman calls a
“front” becomes jeopardized.  A front is “that part of individual’s per-
formance which regularly functions in a general and fixed fashion to
define the situation for those who observe the performance.  Front,
then, is the expressive equipment of a standard kind intentionally or
unwittingly employed by the individual during his performance.”132
Particularly in a digital world with multiple information sources and
multiple audiences are converging in social networks, impression
management becomes a struggle.
For example, when a young teen (or one of her friends) posts a
picture of her with a red plastic cup at a party or in a state of quasi-
nudity, she is more likely to be considering the immediate audi-
ences—her friends in school, her virtual friends and perhaps her par-
ents—rather than prospective future audiences—college admissions
officers, possible employers, and future acquaintances.  It is unlikely
130 Id.
131 Further, when the accepted definition of the situation has been discredited,
some or all of the actors may nevertheless pretend that nothing has changed, if they
find this strategy profitable—a type of willed credulity.
132 Id. at 22.
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that she is considering that five years in the future a prospective
employer may wrongly analyze the red plastic cup to contain illegal
alcohol, deem her bikini pictures to bespeak poor judgment and a
signal to him to hire someone more responsible-seeming.  Today’s
teenage pictures and rants may be tomorrow’s stigma.133  In
Goffman’s words, “a certain bureaucratization of the spirit is expected
so that we can be relied upon to give a perfectly homogenous per-
formance at every appointed time.”134
The usability of the technology itself further complicates this set
of risks: privacy settings frequently provide a false sense of security to
children, emboldening them to overshare information in the rapture
of a moment, forgetting that the data then leaves their control in
unanticipated ways.  Further, the standard child protection avenues of
parental supervision that exist in physical space often fail in digital
spaces.  Children frequently refuse to “friend” their parents in social
networks, for example, or when they agree to “friend” them, it is fre-
quently with such restricted access that meaningful supervision cannot
happen short of sneaky parental conduct.135  Anecdotal tales of par-
ents cracking into their children’s Facebook accounts to monitor their
children’s conduct abound.136  Apart from the practical infeasibility of
expecting every parent to be a technology expert and a “hacker,” the
familial dynamics fostered by this kind of supervision expectation are
obviously not positive.  It is precisely because we acknowledge that
parents cannot successfully supervise their children every minute of
the day that we exempt childhood in various bodies of law in physical
space.137  In the case of technology-mediated communication, these
133 By virtue of [the ability to read cues], the audience my misunderstand the
meaning that a cue was designed to convey, or may read an embarrassing
meaning into gestures or events that were accidental. . . . In response to
these communication contingencies, performers commonly attempt to exert
a kind of synecdochic responsibility, making sure that as many as possible of
the minor events in the performance, however instrumentally inconsequen-
tial these events may be, will occur in such a way as to convey either no
impression or an impression that is compatible and consistent with the over-
all definition of the situation that is being fostered.
Id. at 51.
134 Id. at 56.
135 See e.g., My Kids Refuse to Accept My Friendship on Facebook, CIRCLE OF MOMS,
(Dec. 3, 2008), http://www.circleofmoms.com/moms-of-college-kids/my-kids-refuse-
to-accept-my-friendship-on-facebook-121163.
136 See Chris Matyszczyk, Police Chief: Hack Your Kids’ Facebook Passwords, CNet (Feb.
16, 2011), http://news.cnet.com/8301-17852_3-20032150-71.html.
137 In many legal contexts we acknowledge children’s inability to foresee and pro-
cess in the ways adults can; but, we adopt a long-term perspective on their develop-
ment, and we forgive their missteps.  When a child walks into a Ferrari dealership and
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concerns are exacerbated—even reasonable adults frequently wrongly
analyze information flows and the risks associated therewith.138  The
risks to which a particular website or application exposes a user are
not transparent to even the most sophisticated users: vulnerabilities
may exist in the underlying code, which are hidden from the user.139
How can we expect a child to successfully conduct this calculus when
even adult software engineers occasionally commit errors in their
use?140  All these factors may contribute to children’s higher likeli-
hood of mismanaging their information in ways that may prove dam-
aging to them in the future.
2. Stigma
Goffman writes that a
correctly staged and performed scene leads the audience to impute
a self to a performed character, but this imputation—this self—is a
product of a scene that comes off, and is not a cause of it.  The self,
then, as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a
specific location, whose fundamental fates is to be born, to mature,
and to die; it is a dramatic effect arising diffusely from a scene that
is presented, and the characteristic issue, the crucial concern, is
whether it will be credited or discredited.141
Using Goffman’s framework, the danger of information flows rests in
a risk of what he calls “stigma”—the result of a discredited character,
sometimes due to information mismanagement.
is sold a car during the time he is supposed to be in gym class, we forgive this misstep
and allow him to disavow the agreement.  But when a child stupidly posts his name,
address, telephone number, and social security number to Facebook, we are legally
unsure of the consequences at present of disavowing that user agreement.  It is pre-
cisely negotiating this tension between creating expression and creating an impres-
sion that children, particularly teens, are still in the process of learning to manage.
Meanwhile, these child performances now simultaneously play out on two stages at
once—one performance in physical space for a physical audience and a second in
digital spaces for a (sometimes overlapping) virtual audience.
138 For a discussion of risks of information loss and mismanagement, see, e.g.,
Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hidden Engines of Destruction: The Reasonable Expectation of Code
Safety and the Duty to Warn in Digital Products, 62 FLA. L. REV. 109 (2010).
139 Id.
140 See Ed Bott, Google Engineer Calls Google+ a “Pathetic Afterthought” and “Knee-jerk
Reaction”, ZDNET (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/bott/google-engi-
neer-calls-google-a-pathetic-afterthought-and-knee-jerk-reaction/4082.
141 See ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA 252–53 (1986).
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Goffman describes stigma142 as an “undesired differentness” from
what society deems to be “normal” or expected.  According to
Goffman, “we exercise varieties of discrimination [against the stigma-
tized], through which we effectively, if often unthinkingly, reduce his
life chances.”143  Stated another way, stigma for Goffman is a special
kind of gap between what Goffman terms “virtual social iden-
tity” and “actual social identity”:
Society establishes the means of categorizing persons and the com-
plement of attributes felt to be ordinary and natural for members of
each of these categories. . . . We lean on these anticipations that we
have, transforming them into normative expectations, into righ-
teously presented demands. . . . [These assumed demands and the
character we impute to the individual will be called] virtual social
identity.  The category and attributes he could in fact be proved to
possess will be called his actual social identity.144
Although Goffman’s use of the word virtual came long before the
arrival of the Internet, the idea the concept of virtual social identity
embodies is directly applicable.  Goffman repeatedly articulates the
social embeddedness of identity in physical space and the ongoing
process of maintaining fronts:
When an individual presents himself to others, his performance will
tend to incorporate and exemplify the officially accredited values of
the society, more so in fact, than does his behavior as a whole . . . .
Commonly we find that upward mobility involves the presentation
of proper performances and that efforts to move upward and efforts
to keep from moving downward are expressed in terms of sacrifices
made for the maintenance of front.145
Failure to maintain a front correctly frequently results in a form of
social discrediting.
Digital spaces—like physical spaces—are socially embedded, and,
because of this social embeddedness, social discrediting is a constant
danger for children.  A universe of constant real-time status updates
and tweets generates a digital social expectation at odds with the tradi-
tional (physical space) social expectation of filtering and homogene-
ity.  For example, a Facebook friend’s mean Facebook comment can
cause hurt feelings, looking “uncool,” and can even give rise to law-
142 Goffman posits a distinction between those who embrace stigmatized identity




145 Id. at 35–36.
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suits in some cases.146  Further, a Lord of the Flies effect leads to tension
between social embeddedness in physical space and virtual space:
because of the deficit of parental supervision in digital spaces, chil-
dren sometimes turn on each other in more vicious ways that they
would in physical space.
It can be argued that previous generations escaped the full pano-
ply of stigma for past childhood conduct due to the limitations of
physical space and information transfer:  someone had to know some-
one who knew of the allegedly questionable conduct (and rarely had
tangible proof), allowing for discounting of the information, second
chances and plausible deniability.  Certainly greater compartmental-
ization of family, friends, and work life was the norm.  However, as the
Internet increasingly becomes a permanent archive of all digital
speech and conduct, today’s children will be viewed and assessed in
adulthood as the totality of their conduct in digital spaces. The impru-
dent comments of sixteen can harm the college application at eigh-
teen.  Increasingly the Facebook posts of childhood threaten to
damage the job prospects of tomorrow.147  In a world where jobs are
found through the “strength of weak ties”,148 meaning through peo-
ple who are casual social or professional connections without deep
personal knowledge of job candidates, one negatively perceived
Facebook post from childhood may be enough to lose a professional
opportunity.  A world characterized by blended digital audiences, digi-
tal and physical space audience convergence and expanding digital
archiving is conducive to stigma:  children today are likely have a
higher probability of being associated with some form of possibly stig-
matizing content in adulthood than do the children of yesterday.
As the next section argues, however, the value of children’s iden-
tity experimentation goes beyond simply the micro level concerns of
child development.  These questions of childhood expression touch
social questions of creativity, fostering entrepreneurship and innova-
tion.  As history has shown us time and time again, the quirky children
and off-beat adults sometimes offer our society spectacular innova-
tion.  Preserving this space for childhood creativity in a safe environ-
ment is integral to helping innovation and entrepreneurship blossom.
146 See, e.g., Lawyer Sues Facebook Claiming Other Users Defamed Him, TECHDIRT (Oct.
29, 2010), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20101022/18065511555/lawyer-sues-
facebook-claiming-other-users-defamed-him.shtml.
147 See Jenna Wortham, More Employers Use Social Networks to Check Out Applicants,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2009), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/20/more-
employers-use-social-networks-to-check-out-applicants/.
148 See MARK GRANOVETTER, STRENGTH OF WEAK TIES (1973).
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B. Digital Creativity and Entrepreneurship
In addition to the arguments in favor of crafting a safe space for
digital childhood for the benefit of individual children and their
development, a strong argument exists that child protection for con-
duct in digital spaces is a social investment in creativity.149  Fostering
childhood creativity plays a critical role in developing adults capable
of creative thought and the next generation of digital entrepreneur-
ship and invention.  As our economy increasingly becomes a “knowl-
edge economy,” digital creativity and entrepreneurship should be
considered when crafting legal paradigms of childhood.
Turning to the empirical literature on creativity, the importance
of facilitating childhood experimentation and creativity in digital
spaces becomes clear.  Professor Teresa Amabile has explored the
drivers and dynamics of both adult and child creativity.150  In her
pathbreaking work, Growing Up Creative, she defines creativity as a pro-
cess that draws upon talents, education, skills, thinking, working styles,
and inherent intelligence.  She pinpoints motivation as the single
most important ingredient in fostering creativity.151  In particular, she
finds that the strongest forms of motivation in both children and
adults is intrinsic motivation—people are motivated to create for crea-
tivity’s own sake.152  Extrinsic motivation such as money can actually
dampen creativity in some circumstances.153  Further, collaborative
149 Creativity was named the single most important attribute for success in leading
a large corporation in the future in a recent survey of 1500 CEOs by IBM’s Institute
for Business Value, and certainly the next generation of technology entrepreneur-
ship, depends entirely on the dreams, vision, and skills of our next generation of
children. IBM 2010 Global CEO Study: Creativity Selected as Most Crucial Factor for Future
Success, IBM (May 20, 2010), http://www.ibm.com/news/ca/en/2010/05/20/
v384864m81427w34.html.
150 See TERESA AMABILE, GROWING UP CREATIVE (1989).
151 Id.
152 Id.
153 The experimental research that has been done on creativity suggests that
money is not a dominant motivator.  In organizational settings, financial connection
to creativity can be problematic when people believe their creativity or absence
thereof will affect their compensation.  Consequently, in these situations, according
to Amabile, people tend to get risk averse.  Amabile’s
research shows that people put far more value on a work environment where
creativity is supported, valued, and recognized [than on financial rewards
for creativity]. . . . People are most creative when they care about their work
and they’re stretching their skills.  If the challenge is far beyond their skill
level, they tend to get frustrated; if it’s far below their skill level, they tend to
get bored.
Bill Breend, The 6 Myths Of Creativity, FASTCOMPANY, (Dec. 1, 2004), http://www.fast
company.com/magazine/89/creativity.html?page=0%2C0.
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environments foster creativity better than working in isolation or
competition.154
  Psychologists who study childhood creativity tend to believe that
most children have a natural talent for a particular activity.  By letting
a child experiment and explore budding talents, these talents are
more likely to emerge.  Finding these hidden talents, mastering the
skills they require and collaborating well with others are prerequisites
for creativity in adult life.155  In Amabile’s words,
The kernel of creativity is there in the infant: the desire and drive to
explore, to find out about things, to try things out, to experiment
with different ways of handling things and looking at things. As they
grow older, children begin to create entire universes of reality in
their play.156
Digital spaces lend themselves to precisely these kinds of shared
explorations for children.  They offer collaborative environments that
foster creativity and learning new skills in novel ways.157  The inher-
154 According to Amabile,
There’s a widespread belief, particularly in the finance and high-tech indus-
tries, that internal competition fosters innovation.  In our surveys, we found
that creativity takes a hit when people in a work group compete instead of
collaborate.  The most creative teams are those that have the confidence to
share and debate ideas.  But when people compete for recognition, they
stop sharing information.  And that’s destructive because nobody in an
organization has all of the information required to put all the pieces of the
puzzle together.
AMABILE, supra note 149. R
155 See D. Goleman, P. Kaufman, The Art of Creativity, PSYCH. TODAY  (Mar. 1, 1992),
http://www.psychologytoday.com/articles/199203/the-art-creativity.
156 Amabile’s research has identified the main creativity killers: Surveillance, Eval-
uation, Competition, Overcontrol, Pressure. See AMABILE, supra note 149. R
157 By way of example, let’s consider a teen, Kurt, who writes a melodramatic set of
song lyrics about being scorned by his old love interest and posts them to Facebook.
Instantaneously, his 1200 Facebook friends see the lyrics.  Some of them may think
the lyrics are odd, and they wish to dissociate themselves from him.  They may
unfriend him.  However, some of them will like his angst-ridden verbal stylings or feel
empathy for him; they will offer positive emotional reinforcement through hitting the
“like” button on Facebook or by commenting.  Emboldened by this positive experi-
ence, he continues to write creatively as an outlet and to share his work with his
friends on Facebook.  His creative expression is both developmentally desirable for
him as an emotional outlet, and for society as a whole.  Perhaps Kurt will grow up to
become the next Kurt Cobain.  Or perhaps he will grow up to build song-writing
software that will be used by millions of users.  However, should the social network to
which he posted the lyrics allege a copyright in his cumulative body of lyrics and try to
sell them, pursuant to an alleged term in fine print in the social network’s user agree-
ment, we would find this act to be particularly unfair to Kurt.  On the one hand, he
isn’t even old enough to agree to the contract that provided the basis for the content
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ently collaborative structures of social networks, for example, can
stimulate childhood creativity.  Fostering creativity in children may
lead to more creative employees in adulthood and, perhaps, ulti-
mately more adult tolerance for creativity inside organizations.158  In
the interim, our economy increasingly depends on novel
entrepreneurial efforts in technology spaces, and a social commit-
ment is needed to encouraging children’s technology creativity as part
of their development.
The next Part argues in favor of a broad legal conceptualization
of children’s development and posits that the most protective
approach—an extension of minority doctrine and the addition of an
affirmative defense of childhood in copyright—should be the starting
point for constructing a paradigm of childhood in digital spaces.
III. THE FUTURE OF GENERATION C:  IDENTITY AND TINKERING
Two recent changes in technology spaces have sent ripples of
concern over privacy through consumers.  The first change,
license and, on the other hand, perhaps he didn’t want his melodramatic childhood
love angst put to music and broadcast to anyone outside his Facebook friend group.
Further, at the time he expressing himself through writing his lyrics in the vernacular
and themes of a fifteen-year-old child, he is not likely to be considering the ramifica-
tions this melancholy bemoaning of childhood love gone awry may have in the eyes of
his prospective employers six years in the future.
158 Turning to an even more recent and novel branch of creativity research, con-
cern has been raised that our organizational structures hinder rather than foster the
emergence of creative thought.  The work of Professor Mueller and others indicates
that in corporate settings—despite express commitment and statements regarding
valuing and seeking creativity and original thought—the opposite may in fact be true.
See Jennifer M. Mueller et al., The Bias Against Creativity: Why People Desire Yet Reject
Creative Ideas, PSYCH. SCI. (forthcoming).  Although creativity is often mentioned by
corporate leadership, in reality quirky and creative solutions appear to lose out to less
innovative options inside enterprises, and novelty of thought can be stigmatizing
instead of a positive quality for adults in the workplace. A Bias Against ‘Quirky’? Why
Creative People Can Lose Out on Leadership Positions, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Feb. 16,
2011), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2713.  This path-
breaking creativity research may highlight the social importance of child protection
in digital spaces: the most creative adults sometimes face the most stigma for the
creativity of their ideas.  Yet, almost universal agreement exists that the future of our
progressively more digital economy is contingent on the creativity of future entrepre-
neurs. See, e.g., ERIK STAM & ELIZABETH GARNSE, ENTREPRENEURSHIP IN THE
KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY, http://www.dur.ac.uk/resources/dbs//faculty/centre_entre-
preneurship/publications/ResearchPaper018.pdf.  This “bias against creativity” may
explain why arguably a greater number of novel business models tend to come from
startups rather than large established players.  Large organizations frequently prefer
to adopt a strategy of purchasing startups rather than pulling ideas from inside their
organizations, even when the identical concept exists in both places.
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Facebook’s shift to a “timeline” model that is positioned as a cradle-to-
grave archive of user’s lives, was perceived as yet another step toward
pushing a vision of “radical transparency”159 in Internet conduct.160
Second, Google’s harmonization of over sixty privacy policies across
all its products struck a chord with consumers as an attempt to share
data in a manner that consumers had not intended or anticipated.161
As the prior sections have argued, child protection in digital
spaces is desirable both for reasons of child development and foster-
ing creativity in our society.  Although at least one statutory attempt
has previously been made by Congress to create a child protection
regime in digital contexts,162 a different approach is needed.  The
approach set forth in the following section argues in favor of the
minority defense to capacity extending strongly into digital spaces,
particularly with respect to commercial privacy contracting situations.
Through crafting child protection in this manner, we begin to
rebalance the impression management dynamic in favor of the
child—an important first step toward a broader structure of children’s
data accountability.
Above, I have argued that the work of Erving Goffman and crea-
tivity theorists offers us insights into the developmental and social
importance of crafting a safe space for childhood in digital spaces.
Now, turning to insights from social psychology theory with respect to
identity salience, roles, and boundaries, I will argue that the first piece
of a successful paradigm of digital childhood must begin with giving
children back the ability to engage in “keying” of identity through an
extension of the contract doctrine of minority into digital spaces.  It is
the first step toward allowing children the ability to both manage digi-
tal identity and experiment with creative code expression.  Second,
introducing the distinction between process-focused and outcome-
focused analysis of creativity, I will argue in favor of crafting a child-
hood exception in copyright to protect children’s constructive creativ-
159 See, e.g., danah boyd, Facebook and “Radical Transparency”, ZEPHORIA (May 14,
2010), http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2010/05/14/facebook-and-radi-
cal-transparency-a-rant.html.
160 See, e.g., Ron Waugh, You WILL Reveal Your Past! Facebook’s Timeline Feature
Becomes Mandatory for All Users—With Just 7 Days to ‘Clean Up’, DAILY MAIL (Jan. 26,
2012), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2091735/Facebook-Timeline-
mandatory-users—just-7-days-clean-up.html.
161 See, e.g., EPIC Watchdog Group Sues FTC To Stop Google Privacy Policy Changes,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/02/08/epic-
ftc-google-privacy_n_1263844.html.
162 Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2006).
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ity and limiting destructive creativity to injunction, restitution, and
disgorgement remedies.
A. The Crafted Self:  Freedom to Develop
In a commercial world where databases of aggregated informa-
tion craft what Professor Dan Solove has termed “digital dossiers”163
on each of us, the ability of adults to avoid being impacted by impru-
dent content from their childhood seems highly unlikely without a
change in law.  Goffman would analyze this dynamic as a problem of
interpretative framing and “keying”—namely, “a systematic transfor-
mation . . . across materials already meaningful in accordance with a
schema of interpretation,” which “utterly changes what it is a partici-
pant would say was going on.”  Keying thus involves a “rewriting” of
held information that fundamentally affects how observers organize
their experience of those materials.164  In other words, keying turns
on “the individual’s capacity to acquire, reveal and conceal informa-
tion.”  More specifically, “[j]ust as it can be assumed that it is in the
interests of the observer to acquire information from a subject, so it is
in the interests of the subject to appreciate that this is occurring and
to control and manage the information the observer obtains.”165  It is
precisely this ability that children today are losing.
1. Keying:  Restoring Control over Children’s Role Salience
As explained above, loss of information control over presentation
of self can be analyzed as a problem of Goffman’s concept of “keying.”
Operationalizing this concept into the language of psychology, some
social psychology identity theorists166 have argued that the self is com-
posed of a group of role identities, each of which is connected to the
self when embedded in a particular “role”.167  Roles can relate to
work, family, or other interpersonal relationships which come with
163 See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON (2006).
164 See ERVING GOFFMAN, STRATEGIC INTERACTION 10 (1969).
165 Id.
166 Two schools of thought exist in social psychology that are sometimes con-
fused—on the one hand, identity theory, which emphasizes role behavior and on the
other social identity theory, which emphasizes group process and intergroup rela-
tions.  Identity theory focuses on the self as comprised of the various roles as the
source of identity, and social identity theory focuses on the groups to which people
belong as a source of identity.  M. Hogg et al., A Tale of Two Theories: A Critical Compari-
son of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory, 58 SOC. PSYCH. Q. 255, 255–69 (1995).
167 See Sheldon Stryker & Peter Burke, The Past Present and Future of an Identity
Theory (2000), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/16210252/Stryker-Identity-
Theory.
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and create a set of associated meanings and expectations for the per-
son, and may influence behavior.168  Role identities can be organized
hierarchically into a “salience hierarchy” of roles, with the most salient
roles being most likely to be called upon in situations that involve dif-
ferent aspects of the self.169  In other words, the position of a particu-
lar role identity in this hierarchy—its salience170—explains the degree
of prominence we attach to our various role identities and, poten-
tially, the degree of effort we put into each role.171  However, because
role identities have permeable boundaries and are interdependent,
they sometimes conflict with each other.172  This may particularly be
true of children and teens whose conception of self and roles is
evolving.
In those cases when role identities conflict, the self must either
integrate or segment these role identities.  Integration involves
blending two roles identities, while, role segmentation is associated
with large discrepancies in role identities.173  Stated another way, a
person is forced to negotiate the fit of their preferences, the salience
of their various role identities, and the boundaries allowed by their
social context—to decide whether to integrate or segment their vari-
ous role identities.174
168 See P.J. Burke & D.C. Reitzes, The Link Between Identity and Role Performance, 44
SOC. PSYCH. Q. 83, 83–92 (1981).
169 See Hogg, supra note 166. R
170 Identities can be defined as the answer to the question “Who am I?”  Many of
the “answers” are connected with the roles or jobs we perform.  Sheldon Stryker & S.
Serpe, Commitment, Identity Salience, and Role Behavior: Theory and Research Example in
PERSONALITY, ROLES, AND SOCIAL BEHAVIOR 206 (William Ickes & E.S. Knowles, eds.
1982).
171 See Burke & Reitzes, supra note 167. R
172 See R.M. KANTER, WORK AND FAMILY IN THE UNITED STATES 417–27 (1977); J.H.
Pleck, The Work-Family Role System, SOCIAL PROBLEMS 24 (1977).
173 The questions examined in both the research on role identity salience and in
boundary theory focus on how individuals value, negotiate, and cross the lines of
demarcation of their various role identities. See S.C. Clark, Work/Family Border Theory:
A New Theory of Work/Family Balance, HUMAN RELATIONS, 53(6), 747–70 (2000).
Boundary theory, an offspring of identity theory, considers the blurring of these role
identity lines and the outcomes that result, such as changes in meaning that people
assign to roles and the ease of transition among them. See C. NIPPERT-ENG, HOME AND
WORK (1996); B.E. Ashforth et al., All in a Day’s Work: Boundaries and Micro Role Transi-
tions, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 472, 472–91 (2000).  Boundary theory is a general cogni-
tive theory of social classification. See E. Zerubavel, Lumping and Splitting: Notes on
Social Classification, 11 SOC. F. 421, 421–23 (1996).
174 Role integration and segmentation is a continuum, and a person may select
differently in different situations.  For example, a person may hold a job as a high
school teacher, and in this position he acts with decorum, setting a positive model for
his students.  But, on weekends our high school teacher may perform in a rock band
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Internet intermediation of identity disrupts role salience and a
child’s control of his role hierarchy.  When identity is intermediated,
this process of controlling the extent of role integration and segmen-
tation is taken away from the child and instead placed in the hands of
the intermediary.  The child’s desired salient role identity may
become overshadowed by the identity that the intermediary instead
chooses to project for that child.  As presidential candidate Rick
Santorum learned, Google does not ask you what search results
should be associated with your name.175  In essence, segmented role
identity becomes almost impossible in a highly intermediated world of
information.176  Intermediaries, particularly social network services,
essentially force all users into a highly integrated identity hierarchy
regardless of the user’s actual salience hierarchy.
that performs songs with adult themes.  He enjoys both his roles as high school
teacher and rocker but has chosen to firmly compartmentalize the two role identities
and maintain a sharp division between them.  The two role identities are strongly
segmented: he functions effectively in each situation independently without reliance
of the other role identity.  He would not invoke his rock band persona in the middle
of teaching an algebra class.  In general, the research tends to indicate that maintain-
ing firm boundaries on role identities makes it easier to manage borders of different
roles.  Conversely, integrating role identities facilitates transitions across roles because
of increased flexibility and permeability. See Clark, supra note 172; NIPPERT-ENG, R
supra note 172.  Flexibility refers to the malleability of the boundary between two or R
more role/domains to accommodate the demands of one domain or another. See
Ashforth et al., supra note 172.  Permeability involves the extent to which a boundary R
allows psychological or behavioral aspects of one role or domain to enter another. Id.
However, more integrated roles increase the chance of role blurring —a potentially
undesirable result. See S. Desrochers, Measuring Work-Family Boundary Ambiguity: A Pro-
posed Scale, Bronfenbrenner Life Course Ctr. Working Paper #02-04 (2002).  Role
blurring may trigger confusion and anxiety about which role should be more salient
in a particular situation.  When an individual chooses to maintain a highly segmented
set of role identities, the benefit is that each role is associated with a particular time
and place, allowing an individual to immerse completely in each role.  The individual
controls the context: the high school classroom triggers a different set of behaviors
from the teacher-rocker than being on stage at a show.  The downside is that the
contrast between roles makes it more difficult to transition between the two roles. See
Ashforth, et al., supra note 172. R
175 See Dan Mitchell, Santorum’s ‘Google Problem’ Isn’t Google’s Problem, CNN (Feb. 10,
2012), http://tech.fortune.cnn.com/2012/02/10/google-santorum/.
176 For example, the intermediary will likely blur the high school teacher-rocker
role identities into one identity, despite the fact that the individual in question had
gone to lengths to maintain role separation.  Despite the high school teacher’s utmost
professionalism in the classroom, perhaps because someone else tags him in a picture
posted to a social network during a weekend performance, a future employer may
reject him from consideration—based on an integrated identity constructed by an
intermediary and not by the person himself.
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Consequently, even some adult users feel they have lost control of
their salience hierarchies to digital intermediaries.177  This dynamic
comes as no surprise, however, where intermediary conduct norms
are governed solely by unnegotiable form contracts user “consent.”178
A continuing spiral of progressively more aggressive intermediary con-
duct is likely, which will, in turn, likely result in increased loss of chil-
dren’s control over their identity management.
Turning to the example of cyberbullying, we see the importance
of  regaining role salience control. For a child who is being bullied,
perhaps the most traumatic harm is the bullies’ usurping of identity
creation. The tormentors of the bullied child pollute both virtual
space and physical space with negative content about their victim.
However, as the next section describes, expressly extending the con-
tract doctrine of minority changes the equation when a child has lost
control of his salience hierarchy in digital spaces.
2. Extending the Contract Doctrine of Minority to Digital Spaces
In his book Delete, Professor Viktor Mayer-Schonberger argues
that “forgetting has become the exception, and remembering the
default.”179  In other words, deletion of information requires con-
scious steps by individuals and, most likely, legal intervention.  Pro-
tecting children online starts with the simple extension of a strong
version of the minority doctrine to digital spaces.  State contract law,
either statutorily or doctrinally, can expressly extend the child protections
already present in contract law relating to physical spaces into digital spaces,
allowing minors to set aside digital as well as physical space contracts
and force the deletion of their data by the holder.180
177 See Mary Madden & Aaron Smith, Reputation Management and Social Media, PEW
INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT (May 2010), http://www.pewinternet.org/~/media//
Files/Reports/2010/PIP_Reputation_Management_with_topline.pdf.
178 However, intermediaries would assert that even these users have given contrac-
tual consent, and no problem exists.  Meaningful contractual consent becomes an
increasingly tenuous construct in this circumstance where end user license agree-
ments have become progressively more complex, unnegotiable, and unilaterally
amendable in the discretion of the intermediary. See Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Mutually
Assured Protection: Toward Development of Relational Internet Data Security and Privacy Con-
tracting Norms, in SECURING PRIVACY IN THE INTERNET AGE 78–79 (Anupam Chander et
al. eds., 2008).
179 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger, DELETE (2009).
180 In many cases minors lack the judgment to be guarded with their information.
Instead, they frequently overdisclose, potentially leading to damaging commodifica-
tion of their data streams.  For example, minors may be less likely to realize that their
online behaviors and their pictures may be viewable by a large circle of advertisers
and even future employers.  Particularly in the context of digital exchanges, children
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Why should we start here?  Why would the doctrine of minority
improve the current confusion across conflicting childhood para-
digms?  The reason for this simple extension as the logical starting
point rests in its nondisruptiveness from the standpoint of existing
law—the doctrine of minority has existed for centuries in U.S. law in
physical spaces, as the first section explained—and its simultaneous
efficacy in terms of restoring control to children over their roles’ sali-
ence.  The rationale for the existence of the minority doctrine per-
tains to children’s lack of capability to understand the consequences
of their actions and the likelihood that adults with superior knowl-
edge will take advantage.  Certainly this rationale holds true with
respect to minors’ interactions in digital spaces; in a world of convo-
luted legalistic user agreements, even reasonable adults frequently
have trouble understanding the implications of their digital conduct
because of the opacity of the technology they are using and its accom-
panying user agreements.
Because of the opacity of the underlying technology and contract
terms, and especially where the unilateral right to modify terms is
retained for their drafter, it is unjust to bind minors to unnegotiated
digital contracts of adhesion.  Further, as the discussion of Erving
Goffman’s work argued, the resulting social stigma has negative conse-
quences.181  As I have also argued elsewhere,182 when a user partici-
pates in a digital service, the exchange that transpires involves the
exchange of a license to access the user’s information—a legally suffi-
cient form of consideration—for access to the service.183  There is no
such thing as a “free” service; a child’s information is a valuable com-
modity transferred in exchange for inducing access to the service.
The license to the service reciprocally conventionally induces the
may feel artificially at ease, both because of their technological proficiency and
because of the artificial sense of safety due to their physical safety at the time.  This
sense of physical safety encourages them in their experimentation in digital spaces
and engaging in conduct that might seem threatening in real space.  Yet, as previous
sections have argued, this experimentation is both developmentally healthy and good
for creativity.  As such, a clear legal space for digital childhood is needed.  Although
this approach may seem to implicate the First Amendment interests of the data aggre-
gator on first blush, in fact, it does not.  It would be likely to survive even a First
Amendment challenge.  Legal scholars have opined that contract-based approaches
to privacy do not pose the First Amendment problems of other approaches. See, e.g.
Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a
Right to Stop People from Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049 (2000).
181 See GOFFMAN, supra note 141. R
182 See Matwyshyn, supra note 100. R
183 Id.
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license to the child’s information and vice versa.184  Nevertheless, the
current business norm is that when the minor discontinues using the
service, a service currently continues to use the minor’s data and to
derive derivative revenue, despite providing no continued services to
the minor.
If these contracts existed in physical space, the minor’s right to
set aside the agreement would be appropriate and, in most states, not
barred by any of the usual exceptions.  Congress has expressly stated a
desire for digital contracts to exist in parity with physical space agree-
ments.  Ergo, a strong form of the minority doctrine should also offer
the same remedy in digital spaces as in physical spaces.
At the point a minor requests to set aside a digital agreement, the
operator of the site would be bound to discontinue extracting consid-
eration of any sort from the minor for use of the services, including
discontinuing the use of the minor’s previously shared information.
Specifically, this means that in instances where the minor’s considera-
tion is a stream of data about the minor, at the point of disavowal of
the contract by the minor, the contract ends, as should the flow of
consideration.185  In this case, because a license for the information
no longer exists, all data collected from the minor should be deleted
from the aggregator’s possession and the databases of its information
partners.  This includes any material tagged in a manner connected to
the minor’s account.  With respect to questions that arise due to the
minor’s misrepresentation of age, statutes of limitations, and other
procedural questions, the contract law defaults of the state of resi-
dence of the minor would control.
No magic age will be developmentally optimal for all children
with respect to child protection, but, as I have also argued else-
where,186 COPPA’s arbitrary selection of age thirteen as the pivotal
age187 appears illogical and arbitrary in the social context of U.S.
law.188  States vary with respect to the formulation and extent of child
protection they offer their citizens.  Both contract law and the most
successful statutes relating to commercial privacy to date—state data
breach notification statutes—have similarly been operationalized
through state-specific approaches.  As such, the first round of addi-
tional commercial digital child protection statutes may logically be
best suited for passage on the state level.  Some states have experi-
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 See, e.g., Matwyshyn, supra note 53. R
187 Id.
188 Id.
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mented with statutory expansions of the contract-like framework
offered by COPPA, and some of these state laws unfortunately mir-
rored the illogical use of the age of thirteen as a pivot for children’s
data protection.  But, others have expanded the covered age group to
eighteen.189
Through giving a child—especially a bullied child—the ability to
disavow his agreements in connection with his online activities and
require the deletion of the data collected about him, we enable him to
regain control over a portion of his identity.  We also assist him in
crafting a new digital identity through strengthening his ability to seg-
ment the undesirable portions of his life more effectively—a critical
opportunity to assist him in development and possibly overcoming the
pain of his current circumstances.  Without offering this child the abil-
ity to terminate his digital relationships and his contracts online, even
though he may move on to a different school or a different stage in
his life where the bullies do not follow in physical space, the bullies
will always be a vivid memory in virtual space.  Without the ability to
purge this information, a damaged digital history, such as a history of
cyber bullying will follow the child and disrupt future educational and
work contexts.
Similarly, a strong right of minority allows a child who tinkers
with applications but runs afoul of their user agreements the ability to
avoid a major life disruption.  As long as a circuit split exists on the
question of whether a mere breach of contract provides the basis for a
charge of civil and criminal computer intrusion under the Computer
Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”), a subject I have discussed extensively
elsewhere,190 all children’s tinkering which may breach a user agree-
ment places their futures at risk.  Granting this right to disavow agree-
ments offers children a space for creativity and entrepreneurship
without risk of subjecting the child to uncertain and frequently draco-
nian adult copyright and criminal law regimes.  In the next section,
for similar reasons, we turn to concerns over crafting a space for child-
189 A number of states proposed laws that go beyond to better protect children
under thirteen years old online. See, e.g., 2010 IL H.B. 1312 (requiring social network-
ing sites to get written parental permission before a minor can create a profile page,
and would require parents to be provided with ongoing access to their children’s
pages); S.B. 59, Gen. Assem., 2007–2008 (Ga. 2007) (prohibiting social networking
sites from allowing minors to create profiles without parental consent and access to
the minor’s profile); A.B. 108, Gen. Assem., 213th Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2008) (requiring
websites that collect information from children between thirteen and seventeen to
obtain verifiable parental consent); S.B. 132, 2007 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. § 8 (N.C.
2007) (requiring social networking sites to obtain parental consent before a minor
could use their sites).
190 See Matwyshyn, supra note 20. R
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hood creativity and the value of creating a childhood exception in
copyright.
B. The Creative Self:  Freedom to Tinker
In the context of adults, the legal literature demonstrates an
increasingly robust discussion of creativity and intellectual prop-
erty.191  However, little legal scholarship has expressly addressed the
question of childhood creativity, and the connection of childhood cre-
ativity with copyright law is virtually unexamined.  Copyright scholar-
ship almost always presumes the creator to be an adult or that
childhood is not a relevant consideration for copyright.192  Just as cre-
ators are presumed to be adults, as Part I.B explained, so too are
infringers and subject to a single infringement paradigm, regardless
of age.  For example, Professor Herbert Simon argues that “when we
are children, our creative abilities may not yet fully be formed.”193
I argue the contrary – in childhood our ability to create may be at
its most spirited or, using the language of creativity theory, its most
“deviant.”194   As children’s participation in both creation and use of
technology content increases, copyright law must now worry about
children and its impact on their development.   It is imperative to the
future of our knowledge economy to craft a safe space for children’s
development using technology.  The possibility of crippling legal sanc-
tions in copyright against children threatens both their potential for
creativity as adults and the future of entrepreneurship in the United
States.
By way of example, let us examine the childhoods of two entre-
preneurs one might consider “creative”—Bill Gates and Steve Jobs.
191 See, e.g., Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Creativity, Improvisation, and Risk:  Copyright
and Musical Innovation, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1829 (2011); Jeanne C. Fromer, The
Role of Creativity in Trademark Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1885 (2011); Gregory N.
Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process:  Intellectual Property Law and the Psychology of
Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999 (2011); Mark P. McKenna, Introduction: Crea-
tivity and the Law, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1819 (2011).
192 For example, Professor Hughes considers childhood and creativity and argues,
“an intellectual work is a personal reflection of the individual—a reflection of their
infancy, their childhood, their recent experiences, or what they had for lunch today.”
See Justin Hughes, The Personality Interests of Artists and Inventors in Intellectual Property,
16 CDZAELJ 81, 108 (1998).  However, implicit in this statement can be found the
idea of the creator having completed each of these items, i.e., that the creator is an
adult.
193 See Herbert Simon, Culture, Creativity, & Copyright, 29 CDZAELJ 279, 296
(2011).
194 See, e.g., Mark Runco, Creativity Has No Dark Side, in THE DARK SIDE OF CREATIV-
ITY (David H. Cropley et al. eds., 2010).
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Bill Gates began “hacking” computers as a young teen,195 and wrote
his first program, a tic-tac-toe game, at thirteen.196  He demonstrated
a tendency toward independent behaviors focused on technology—a
set of behaviors that was difficult for his parents to control;197 they
coped by granting him additional independence to experiment with
computers.198  He met Steve Allen, the co-founder of Microsoft Cor-
poration at age thirteen.  Similarly, Steve Jobs frequented after-school
lectures at the Hewlett-Packard Company in Palo Alto, California,
while in high school and was hired there, working with Steve Wozniak,
the future co-founder of Apple, Inc.199  Steve Jobs explained the
importance of his childhood tinkering with machines in this way:
Things became much more clear that they were the results of
human creation not these magical things that just appeared in one’s
environment that one had no knowledge of their interiors.  It gave a
tremendous level of self-confidence, that through exploration and
learning one could understand seemingly very complex things in
one’s environment.200
Jobs own early tinkering allegedly involved phone “freaking”—an
early form of telephone network intrusion or “hacking.”201
In the course of the types of “tinkering” that Jobs described—
taking things apart and putting them together again or building your
own version—it is likely that a child will run eventually afoul of a con-
tract or copyright restriction.  The previous section has addressed the
contract question by arguing for a strong extension of the minority
doctrine.  Here, using a discussion a paradigm of creativity of a pro-
cess—as distinct from its constructive and destructive creation—bor-
rowed from creativity theory, I argue for a copyright modification: an
exception for childhood.
195 Portland St. Univ., People Who Have Changed the World, http://www.wc.pdx.edu/
billgates/billy.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
196 Id.
197 See Sue Shellenbarger, Brat or Budding Genius? Lessons From Bill Gates’ Childhood,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 28, 2009), http://blogs.wsj.com/juggle/2009/04/28/brat-or-bud-
ding-genius-lessons-from-bill-gates-childhood/.
198 Id.
199 See STEPHEN WOZNIAK, IWOZ (2006).
200 Video: Steve Jobs One-on-One, the ‘95 Interview, COMPUTERWORLD (Oct. 27, 2011),
http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9221185/Video_Steve_Jobs_one_on_
one_the_95_interview.
201 See STEVE JOBS, ONE LAST THING (2011).
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1. Creativity as a Developmental Process and Childhood
As Part I.B argued, technology has altered the traditional enforce-
ment dynamics of copyright law, and children are now viewed as
potentially attractive defendants in litigation even when their parents
are excluded.  Because of these changing dynamics, childhood creativ-
ity and the “tinkering” that Steve Jobs described are threatened in dig-
ital spaces.  In the next section I will advocate crafting an affirmative
defense of childhood in copyright law.  Here, using creativity theory, I
argue in favor of protecting the creative process for children and
adults.
Several notable copyright scholars have argued in favor of refram-
ing copyright law to focus more on the processes of creation, rather
than simply on the end product of creation.202  As Professor Rebecca
Tushnet has eloquently articulated, “[m]aking a creative work, espe-
cially a creative work that comments on an artifact that other people
will know and have opinions about, gives people their own answers to
[the] question [of ‘who do you think you are?’], and empowers them
to keep talking.”203   Further, as Professors Eduardo Penalver and
Sonia Katyal have argued, the law should be careful not to overdeter
violations of property rights at the expense of other important social
purposes.204  This approach is also consonant with the approach
adopted by creativity theorists.  Creativity theory differentiates
between creative process and the product or consequences of that
process.205  It is only as a second cut—a moral one— where creativity
theory differentiates between positive and negative outcomes,206 what
might be termed “constructive and destructive creations.”  Stated
another way, a particular set of behaviors can accurately be described
as creative regardless of the desirability of the end product.  For example,
202 See e.g,.  Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV.
370, 371 (2006) (arguing that a person “appropriates preexisting cultural goods as an
inevitable part of the process of self-development” and “engages in creative play, with
which ‘copying’ . . . is inextricably linked”); Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-
Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533 (1993) (arguing that self-expression is a fundamental component of creativ-
ity); Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How
Copying Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535, 568–74 (2004) (arguing that “[c]opyrighted works
often serve as the self-expression of someone other than the author”). See generally
LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX (2009).
203 See Rebecca Tushnet, Hybrid Vigor: Mashups, Cyborgs, and Other Necessary Mothers,
6 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 1, 11–12 (2010).
204 See Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 1095 (2007).
205 See, e.g., Runco, supra note 193. R
206 Id. at 21.
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Professor Mark Runco argues that creativity should be defined as “a
process that can and should be kept separate from the product, just as
the causes of any behavior can and should be kept separate from pos-
sible effects of that same behavior.“207  He argues that, in particular,
this definition allows for a more reasoned discussion of the negative
consequences of creativity; it segments the negative consequences
away from the underlying urge to create.  Creativity itself, he argues, is
free of values, but it can result in either positive or negative conse-
quences.  As he explains, the lack of direction of creativity “is what
allows unpredictable insights,” which may either lead to positive or
negative applications.208  He also reminds us that the assessment of
whether the consequences of creativity are positive or negative is
inherently bound up with moral judgments on the products or conse-
quences.209  Protecting the possibility of this process of creation is
arguably even more important than protecting its outcome.  Current
copyright law threatens this process for children in digital spaces.
Questions regarding childhood creativity highlight the impor-
tance of the distinction between creative process and desirable out-
comes. I argue that it is even more important to protect the creative process in
children from legal sanction than that of adults, even if we do attach a
punitive consequence to any destructive creations that arise from this
childhood creativity.  As Professor Runco further points out, accord-
ing to some developmental studies of children by Kohlberg and
others, children are not always capable of understanding rules and
conforming their behavior in the same ways that adults can.210  He
cautions that “the trick is to recognize that creativity is a form of devi-
ance and then determine how and why it is sometimes used in a
benevolent way and sometimes in a malevolent way.”211  He cites to
work that argues that unconventional or “deviant behavior tends to
peak from late childhood to mid adolescence, and then begins to
decrease in late adolescence to early adulthood.”212  Professor
McLaren, meanwhile, argues that there is a general distorted stereo-
type about creativity that causes us to ignore the creativity of efforts
that result in negative ends.213  It is precisely for this reason—a height-




210 Id. at 22.
211 Id. at 29.
212 Id. at 23.
213 See, e.g., R. McLaren, The Dark Side of Creativity, 6 CREATIVITY RESEARCH J. 137
(1993).
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full understanding of rules—that leaves children more vulnerable to
running afoul of existing copyright law in their conduct.
The second reason for children’s increased vulnerability to
becoming copyright defendants in digital contexts rests in the ease of
tracking their “tinkering” in digital spaces, while parental supervision
in those spaces becomes more difficult.  For example, imagine that a
ten-year-old child becomes curious as to how the family coffeemaker
works.  He proceeds to disassemble it, screw together parts in various
different combinations and then tries to make coffee.  A parent may
walk in to the kitchen during the disassembly and halt the process
before total destruction of the machine’s functionality.  This process,
while inherently creative as a matter of his development, nevertheless
is likely to result in a destructive creation—a broken coffeemaker, a
mess in the kitchen, and disgruntlement over lack of coffee the next
day.  Of course, the coffeemaker manufacturer is usually unaware of
both the creative process and the destructive creation.
Now imagine that the same ten-year-old child214 is playing a social
game called “Coffeemaker,” which his parents purchased for him for
$1.99 in an online store.  In between the child’s brewing virtual cups
of coffee for his “coffee friends,” he notices that if he clicks in a cer-
tain order on a portion of the user interface, he can cause a dialog
box to appear.  If he types in “more points,” he succeeds in changing
his score.  His parents are unlikely to be aware this act has occurred,
but the game operator is likely to figure it out eventually.  While many
people would construe the child’s conduct as merely finding a vulner-
ability in the game that the game manufacturer should rectify, the
manufacturer may allege that the child has circumvented a copy pro-
tection mechanism, leaving him vulnerable to an allegation of prohib-
ited circumvention under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(“DMCA”) or a charge of computer intrusion under the CFAA on the
basis of a user agreement breach.
Thus, the “tethered” nature of digital spaces—where an intellec-
tual property owner can monitor the usage of its products even after
purchase—and the difficulty of parental supervision in digital spaces
under the current copyright regime will inevitably ensnare increasing
214 At the 2011 DEFCON Kids, a ten year old going by the handle Cyfi found a
vulnerability in a game.  Much like the hypothetical child in this section, she was able
to manipulate her scoring in ways that the creators of the game had not anticipated;
this, consequently, triggered a vulnerability disclosure exchange with the gaming
company.  Sara Yin, 10-Year-Old Presents App Exploit at DefCon, PC MAG (Aug. 8, 2011),
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2390671,00.asp.  Also like the ten-year-old in
the hypothetical, Cyfi likes coffee. Cyfi bio, DEFCON KIDS, http://www.defconkids.
org/?page_id=10#sat17 (last visited Mar. 3, 2012).
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numbers of children during their digital tinkering.  While the out-
comes of these creative processes, like the broken coffeemaker, may
not always be desirable, the fact that these processes are creative in
terms of the development of the child is not disputable; building a society of
inherently creative children is a social good.  In this vein, copyright
should evolve to include an affirmative defense of childhood, granting
children the freedom to tinker in digital spaces.  As Steve Jobs pointed
out, it was his unfettered tinkering which he believed to have provided
the critical foundation for his later entrepreneurship.
2. An Affirmative Defense and Exemption for Childhood in
Copyright
As the previous sections articulated, an inherent benefit exists for
children’s development by allowing them digital breathing room to
engage in tinkering and creative process.  While the created products
of this tinkering may not always be positive, these outcomes should
not destroy the ability of the child to continue her process of creative
exploration and tinkering.  As such this section proposes a childhood
exception in copyright.  This new childhood exception is driven by a
simple principle: copyright law should sanction children only for actual eco-
nomic loss—negative outcomes—but not punish them for their process of tink-
ering. This childhood exception would be operationalized with two
prongs—first, an affirmative defense of childhood under the Copy-
right Act and, second, a childhood exemption under the anticircum-
vention provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.
If the childhood exception is successfully invoked in copyright,
the consequences for any alleged act of infringement should not
include any prison time, nor should they include any statutory dam-
ages.  Damages should be limited only to actual economic loss and
requiring the child’s destruction of the infringing works.  In particu-
lar, a childhood exemption under the DMCA’s anticircumvention
provisions,215 should absolve children from liability under that sec-
tion.  These two limitations on copyright law included within the pro-
posed childhood exception would strike a balance between protecting
the child in her creative process from overzealous intellectual prop-
erty owners while protecting intellectual property owners from any
real losses incurred as a consequence of the child’s creative
experimentation.
The operationalization of this childhood exception and affirma-
tive defense is somewhat straightforward.  For purposes of the DMCA,
215 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
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the copyright office should include a childhood exemption as part of
its regular rulemaking promulgations, exempting children from the
anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA.  With respect to the
remainder of copyright law, Congressional action may be required.
The argument crafted here has direct practical implications for at
least three contexts—children’s codebreaking, children’ filesharing,
and children’s “parody” websites, such as the one at issue in Layshock.
a. Codebreaking
Children’s participation in the codebreaking and (re)building
cycle will likely increase in the future, and this increased participation
of children makes them more likely to run afoul of copyright statutes
such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act216 and its anticircum-
vention provisions.217  As I have explained elsewhere,218 the statutory
regimes that govern deconstruction and “breaking” of computer code
are rife with uncertainty, and circuit splits exist with respect to both
civil causes of action and criminal prosecution.  Particularly when we
consider a future where children will be continuously experimenting
with code, developmentally-appropriate childhood tinkering may
result in children’s lives being unnecessarily harmed through suits
arising from innocent mistakes or even socially beneficial tinkering.
The actions of a creative child who wants to assess how a piece of code
works may potentially result in a contract dispute, an intellectual prop-
erty infringement action or even a criminal charge.
Children “tinkering” with codebreaking can carry with it positive
social consequences.  Apart from the reasons of creativity and entre-
preneurship explained in the last section, instances of children’s tink-
ering have already resulted in better information security for large
numbers of users.  For example, a child found two vulnerabilities in
two different browsers by the age of twelve.219  Although his browser
vulnerability disclosure processes appears to have gone smoothly, vul-
nerability disclosure frequently does not.220  The norms and law
216 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
217 A corollary challenge exists in connection with the interpretation of the Com-
puter Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2006).  A statute passed originally in
1986, the CFAA has been the subject of much uncertainty and critique in both legal
and technology circles.
218 See Matwyshyn, supra note 20. R
219 See 12 Year Old Finds Critical Firefox Flaw Earns $3000 bounty, ZDNET (Oct. 22,
2010), http://www.zdnet.com/blog/security/12-year-old-finds-critical-firefox-flaw-
earns-3000-bounty/7524.
220 Though the term “responsible vulnerability disclosure” sounds cohesive in the-
ory, in practice, the term means very different things to different people.  Depending
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around vulnerability disclosure processes are evolving, and some com-
panies may become even quicker to threaten a child than they would
an adult vulnerability researcher—either alleging infringement or a
violation of anti-circumvention under the DMCA.221  At least until
such time as the vulnerability discourse process becomes clarified,
children need the protection of a childhood exception in copyright.
b. Children’s Filesharing
Children’s filesharing presents one of the most contentious con-
texts of childhood copyright infringement.  A childhood exception
would shift the current trend away from naming children as defend-
ants in copyright litigation over filesharing: by limiting a recovery of
plaintiffs to destruction of the copyrighted content and actual dam-
ages, the incentive structure to sue children becomes meaningfully
altered.  Without the hammer of statutory remedies, children and
their parents are better able to compensate plaintiffs for any real eco-
nomic loss suffered by the plaintiff as a result of the child’s infringing
conduct.  Most importantly, the infringement suit becomes a learning
opportunity for the child, rather than a windfall for the intellectual
property owner.
c. Children’s “Parody” Sites
The children’s speech cases that involve creating websites critiqu-
ing school officials or fake profiles on social network websites fre-
quently also involve the misuse of images protected by copyright.  For
example, taking the facts of the Layshock case, even assuming the First
Amendment analysis is correct and the minor’s speech is protected,
the minor nevertheless arguably engaged in an act of copyright
on the specifics of a particular vulnerability and the personalities of the people
involved on both sides of the disclosure conversation, “responsible disclosure” dynam-
ics currently play out in varied ways and with mixed success.  For example, one per-
son’s “responsible disclosure” is sometimes perceived by others as a competitor’s
employee seeking to gain commercial advantage.  Recent vulnerability disclosure con-
versations between a Google employee and Microsoft have demonstrated this tension.
See Graham Cluley, Tavis Ormandy—Are You Pleased with Yourself? Website Exploits
Microsoft Zero-day, SOPHOS NAKED SEC. (June 15, 2010), http://nakedsecurity.sophos.
com/2010/06/15/tavis-ormandy-pleased-website-exploits-microsoft-zeroday/.
221 Creating clearer standards for best practices in vulnerability disclosure and its
legal consequences will offer an important piece of guidance that will help children
to use their code breaking skills constructively and share their findings appropriately.
For a discussion of security vulnerability disclosure processes and the challenges they
face under current First Amendment doctrine, see Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Hacking
Speech, NW. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
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infringement by taking a copy of the principal’s picture and reusing it
in his fake profile.  Thus, while his speech may have been protected,
his use of the image may not have been.  Although the child may be
subject to a defamation claim because of the destructive product of
his creativity, the borrowing of the principal’s image itself should fall
within an affirmative defense of childhood set forth in this section.
CONCLUSION
In this Article I have argued that four conflicting paradigms of
childhood exist in digital spaces—contract, copyright, speech and pri-
vacy/information security.  Because of reasons of development and
fostering creativity, the contract law approach—the approach of a
childhood exception—must win.  Two changes in particular are war-
ranted.  The first is creating freedom to develop—extending a strong-
version of each state’s minority capacity doctrine to digital spaces, par-
ticularly with respect to questions of information flows and commer-
cial privacy.  The second involves creating a children’s freedom to
tinker.  The crafting of an affirmative defense and exemption for
childhood in copyright would build a notion of child protection and
development into copyright law.
